

Current History

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JANUARY, 1976

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1976

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Current History

JANUARY, 1976

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In this issue, seven articles explore the situation in the Middle East since the 1973 October War. As our introductory article points out: "The 1975 agreements did not achieve an Arab-Israeli peace; instead, they established a period of relative tranquility and stability from which new efforts toward peace could be initiated. In this continuing search for peace in the Middle East, the United States remained the central and indispensable power."

United States Policy in the Middle East

BY BERNARD REICH

*Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs,
George Washington University*

THE UNITED STATES became actively involved in the Arab-Israeli sector of the Middle East during World War II, and in the three decades that followed the focus of its policy was the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict.¹ Its primary objective was to terminate the conflict as a means of achieving regional peace and stability and ensuring United States interests in the region.

Prior to the June War of 1967, various efforts were made to resolve the issues in dispute but these were unsuccessful; the operational objective of the United States thus increasingly centered on the maintenance of regional security and stability and the promotion of economic and social development as means to prevent war. The June War brought substantial change to the region, and in the ensuing period the United States again identified its interest in peace, increased its involvement, and strengthened its efforts to achieve a settlement. United States President Lyndon B. Johnson articulated a United States commitment to peace based on five principles: the recognized right of national life; justice for the refugees; innocent maritime passage; limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and political independence and terri-

torial integrity for all states. His successor, President Richard Nixon, subsequently stressed new initiatives to achieve a settlement, including support for the United Nation's Gunnar Jarring mission, four-power talks, bilateral United States-Soviet Union discussions, consultations with Israel and the Arab states, and several unilateral United States efforts, like the Rogers' "plans" of 1969, 1970, and 1971. Especially in the Nixon period, this activity reflected the United States view that the conflict provided the potential for superpower confrontation. In support of its policy, the United States became a principal supplier of sophisticated military equipment to Israel to maintain the regional military balance. Increasingly, it was identified by both Israel and the Arabs (especially by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat) as the critical extra-regional power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite American concern and involvement, no substantial movement toward peace was achieved.²

In the two years preceding the October War, a new status quo, with little movement toward a settlement, was emerging. In 1971, the United States launched its effort to achieve an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal and a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai peninsula; this was supplemented later with the concept of "proximity" talks between Israel and Egypt with then Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco acting as the intermediary. Although this approach was accepted by Israel it was rejected by Egyptian President Sadat, who preferred a return to the Jarring mission. No substantive progress toward a settlement was made

¹ Prior to World War II, American activities in the Middle East were primarily private and generally religious, philanthropic, medical, educational, cultural and commercial in nature. Official actions were severely circumscribed.

² For a survey of United States policy in the period prior to 1971, see Bernard Reich, "United States Policy in the Middle East," *Current History*, vol. 60 (January, 1971), pp. 1-6.

during 1972 and 1973. The effort to achieve a settlement seemed to await each new event (like the Moscow summit meeting of May, 1972, and the Washington summit meeting of June, 1973) as if it might offer some new opening to achieve a settlement. But at both summit meetings the superpowers showed no great concern for Middle East developments—the area was a matter of low priority and the powers seemed content to exchange views.

In the Middle East, this attitude was welcomed by Israel but not by Arab decision makers. Israel was increasingly sanguine about the situation since neither regional nor great power pressures were forcing her to modify her position. Israelis felt that the status quo was weighted in their favor, and they enjoyed internal tranquility and economic prosperity. In contrast, Egypt and the other Arab states were frustrated by the lack of superpower effort to oust Israel from the occupied territories.

Although the United States appeared to see no need for major policy changes, there remained an undercurrent of American concern with the region and there was some expectation that this would be reflected in intensified peace efforts.³ But the United States believed that an interim agreement on the Suez Canal achieved through proximity talks was a useful first stage toward an overall settlement based on Resolution 242; thus it continued to promote this procedure. By the end of the summer of 1973, however, increasing concern about the energy situation (and possible difficulties in obtaining Arab oil) and the linkage of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict generated a new momentum.⁴ This redesignation of the Middle East as a matter of highest priority coincided with

the accession of Henry Kissinger to the post of United States Secretary of State and set the stage for a new United States effort to resolve the conflict. The subsequent American effort to promote the diplomacy to terminate the Arab-Israeli conflict was undertaken with a certain sanguinity that was shattered by the unexpected October War.

THE OCTOBER WAR

The war that erupted on October 6, 1973, caught the United States by surprise. In the last hours prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, the United States tried to prevent the conflict. Once the war began, the United States launched a multifaceted effort to limit the extent of regional conflict, to avoid confrontation or conflict with the Soviet Union, and to halt the fighting in such a way that the postwar environment was more conducive to a settlement than the environment that preceded it.

The United States inaugurated a massive airlift of military supplies to Israel in an effort to redress the military imbalance brought about by an ongoing shipment of Soviet military equipment to Syria and Egypt and by heavy Israeli losses. After some two weeks of combat a cease-fire negotiations formula was developed (by Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Kissinger during Kissinger's visit to Moscow) and was later adopted by the United Nations Security Council as Resolution 338. After the breakdown of the initial cease-fire and its subsequent restoration, and after a worldwide precautionary alert of United States troops on October 25 (in response to a reported alert of Soviet airborne troops), post-October War United States diplomacy emerged. Kissinger foreshadowed his future efforts in a statement on October 25, 1973:

The United States is prepared to make a major effort to help speed a political solution which is just to all sides. The United States recognizes that the conditions that produced the war on October 6th cannot be permitted to continue. . . .⁵

This signaled the intensification of American efforts to achieve some form of accommodation and marked the beginning of Kissinger's role in United States Middle East policy.⁶ Over the next two years, United States involvement in the region intensified,⁷ and the region assumed the high priority status Nixon had mentioned before the hostilities.

Neither side could claim a decisive military victory although each side subsequently claimed it had "won the war." Thereafter Kissinger based his postwar efforts on the fact that there had been "no victory" or a "double victory," and on the "interim settlement" concept. After the Security Council mandated cease-fire became effective, Kissinger concentrated on pragmatic first steps on the road to peace—the stabilization of the cease-fire and the disengagement of hostile

³ In a 1972 interview discussing his plans for his second administration, Nixon said: "The Middle East will have a very high priority because while the Mideast has been, over the past couple of years, in a period of uneasy truce or armistice, or whatever you want to call it, it can explode at any time." See *The New York Times*, November 10, 1972.

⁴ In a statement on September 5, 1973, Nixon said: "We have put at the highest priority moving toward making some progress toward settlement of that [i.e. Arab-Israeli] dispute." *Department of State Bulletin*, September 24, 1973, p. 386.

⁵ Department of State Press Release, no. 390, p. 11.

⁶ Prior to becoming Secretary of State, Kissinger had occasionally been interested in the Middle East; but the major Middle East efforts of the Nixon administration were concentrated in the State Department.

⁷ In a statement at a dinner for Heads of Delegations and the U.N. Permanent Representatives from countries who are members of the Arab League at the United Nations on September 29, 1975, Kissinger noted this intensity: "Little did we know 2 years ago what our active involvement in the search for peace would mean in effort and anguish. . . . I have made 11 trips to the Middle East, amounting in time to almost 1 week out of 6 over this 2-year period. And two Presidents of the United States have met with many of the area's chiefs of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers." See Department of State Press Release, no. 506, September 29, 1975.

forces. Initially, he focused on Egypt because of her important position in the Arab world and because of the unstable postwar military situation resulting from the unusual post-hostilities troop deployments along the Suez Canal. Some form of accommodation might also be developed more easily with the moderate Sadat than with the more mercurial and unpredictable Syrian President Hafez Assad.⁸ Israeli and Egyptian officers met at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road on October 28, 1973, and agreed to permit relief for the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Subsequently, and with Kissinger's aid, Egypt and Israel concluded a six-point agreement to implement resolution 338 and to stabilize the cease-fire, which was signed on November 11. Most of the provisions were subsequently implemented, but the problem of disengagement and the separation of forces continued.

The problem remained unresolved when the Geneva Conference met on December 21, 1973. The conference was followed by negotiations on disengagement that continued into January, 1974, with little success. Kissinger left Washington on January 10 to begin his Egypt-Israel shuttle that culminated in an agreement, announced on January 17, providing for the disengagement and the separation of military forces. Additional assurance and understanding made to and by Kissinger remained secret. The disengagement agreement prepared the way for a similar arrangement between Israel and Syria and improved the United States position in the Arab world.

The Syria-Israel disengagement further enhanced the United States position in the region and the prestige and reputation of Kissinger and, by extension, Nixon. The agreement produced a euphoric public mood; the United States clearly regarded Kissinger's efforts as central to the settlement process.

The agreement between Israel and Syria marked the end of the first phase of United States postwar diplomacy and indicated some of the changing parameters of this policy. To cap this first phase, to reinforce its accomplishments, and to reap the public relations benefits to be derived therefrom, Richard Nixon visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel and Jordan in June. In a series of communiqués, agreements and statements, the United States clarified its continuing commitment to peace in the region and closer cooperation with the Arab states. Diplomatic relations were restored with Syria; pledges of im-

proved cooperation and the establishment of Joint Commissions between the United States and Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia suggested that practical elements would support the statements of principle. The United States also sought to reassure Israel.

The achievement of the two disengagement agreements reduced the threat of war in part by restructuring the on-the-ground complex pattern of troop deployments and providing for UNEF and UNDOF buffer forces* between the respective parties; it also provided the basis for further efforts. But these were limited agreements dealing with pressing military problems and did not involve central political concerns.

The second stage would prove more difficult. United States efforts to develop second-phase agreements began in the summer of 1974 with consultations in Washington, but these discussions, overshadowed by the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting, the Cyprus crisis and Nixon's resignation, did not point clearly in the direction of an agreement. Kissinger visited the region in October; however his efforts were soon clouded by developments at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat, and, later at the United Nations. He returned to the Middle East in November to reassess his step-by-step diplomacy in light of the Rabat decision to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Kissinger's visit averted the collapse of his effort to achieve step-by-step agreements. But clearly the regional and extra-regional events relating to the Palestine summit had complicated the situation. Nonetheless, the Egyptian-Israeli focus for discussions was reaffirmed, and further diplomatic probing focused on the next step in that sector.

Kissinger visited the Middle East again in early February, 1975, on "an exploratory trip" to determine the possibilities for an agreement; he was apparently sufficiently buoyed by his discussions to return in March. Kissinger subsequently made a number of trips between Egypt and Israel, with brief stops elsewhere. Egypt sought extensive Israeli territorial withdrawals while Israel sought substantial Egyptian political concessions. Although there were areas of agreement, the differences proved irreconcilable. Israel would not give up the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes and the valuable oilfields at Abu Rudeis in return for a short-term, essentially non-political agreement. Egypt would accept no less than the passes and the oilfields. The failure of the third Kissinger shuttle ended a euphoric post-October War period in which two important, but primarily technical (and, critically, apolitical), agreements were reached.

The diplomatic failure led to a brief flirtation with the concept of utilizing the Geneva Conference to work for an overall settlement, but this was soon dis-

* United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF); United Nations Disengagement Force (UNDOF).

⁸ An additional factor was the role of Saudi Arabia. Although United States-Saudi relations had been friendly, the post-October War period signaled a new importance in the relationship. Saudi Arabia's role was central to the oil embargo and to the broader questions of oil supply and price. Her leadership role in the Arab world, and her wealth (especially surplus revenues) made her position critical. If Saudi Arabia had opposed Sadat's policy of working with the United States the process might well have been abandoned.

carded in favor of a renewed effort to achieve another interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Within a brief period, each of the central actors (i.e., the United States, Israel and Egypt) appeared ready to revive the Kissinger effort and to revert to a step-by-step approach. The United States viewed the March failure as only a setback, regarded the step-by-step process as suspended rather than terminated. United States President Gerald Ford ordered a "reassessment" of United States policy to determine appropriate "next steps" in light of the disarray of the international environment, including the Communist victory in Cambodia and Vietnam. The reassessment also served to pressure Israel to modify her position to move closer to Egypt, thus allowing a United States effort to bridge the gap. This objective was officially denied, but indirect and private comments by senior United States officials blamed Israel for not being sufficiently accommodating. United States diplomatic "signals" to Israel, including arms supply slowdowns and diplomatic coolness, reinforced this view. Following a cooling-off period, the United States reinstituted the step-by-step process and engaged in a "reversed shuttle," in which the parties sent their views, and sometimes their representatives, to Kissinger in Washington, D.C., for consultations.

The process of achieving an agreement took a substantial step forward with the June meetings of Ford with Sadat in Europe and, later, with Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin in Washington, D.C. Another Kissinger shuttle followed. Finally, a complex of agreements was initialed on September 1 in Jerusalem and Alexandria and was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975.*

The Sinai agreements of September 1, 1975, provided for Israeli withdrawal from territory in Sinai

(including the passes and the oilfields) in exchange for Egyptian political concessions and pledges of United States support. Israel and Egypt agreed to observe the cease-fire on land, sea, and in the air, and to refrain from the threat or use of force or military blockade; they established a new buffer zone and agreed to extend the mandate of UNEF annually. They also agreed to continue negotiations for a final peace agreement and Egypt promised that nonmilitary cargoes for or from Israel would be permitted to use the Suez Canal. An annex spelled out some details for the implementation of the agreement. There was also an American proposal providing for an early warning system in which up to 200 United States volunteer civilians would participate and would report to both Israel and Egypt.⁹ In addition to the formal agreement released by the United States Department of State, other agreements were subsequently made public by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.¹⁰ These incorporated United States assurances to Israel and to Egypt on various matters, including military and economic assistance, the Geneva Peace Conference, and oil for Israel.

The 1975 agreements did not achieve an Arab-Israeli peace; instead they established a period of relative tranquility and stability from which new efforts toward peace could be initiated. In this continuing search for peace in the Middle East, the United States remained the central and indispensable power.¹¹ The United States maintained a special relationship with Israel (formalized to a significant degree by the various ancillary accords and understandings of 1975), while dramatically improving its relations with the Arab world. This was symbolized by various agreements and by the restoration of diplomatic relations with Arab states, the establishments of joint commissions, economic and military assistance, Richard Nixon's visit to the region, Gerald Ford's meetings with regional leaders and Sadat's October/November, 1975, visit to Washington, D.C.

The 1975 accords thus marked the latest, but not the last, step toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. It was a significant step. In Kissinger's view:

"That agreement—if carried out in good faith by both parties—may well mark a historic turning point away from the cycle of war and stalemate that has for so long afflicted Israel and Arabs and the world at large.¹²

(Continued on page 42)

Bernard Reich has held a Fulbright Research Scholar grant for Egypt and a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellowship for research in Israel. He has written extensively on United States policy in the Middle East and on various aspects of Israel's politics and foreign policy. A major study of United States-Israel relations by Bernard Reich will be published later in 1976.

* For the complete text of the agreements, see pp. 33ff. of this issue.

⁹ In a press conference on September 16, 1975, President Ford described the 200 American technicians in the following terms: "They will be there during the term of the agreement unless I, or another President, withdraw them because of any danger to their lives. It is a case of not more than 200 Americans performing a highly technical warning station responsibility in a U.N. buffer zone. I think it is a good contribution by the United States to the establishment and permanency of peace in the Middle East." The Americans were to be non-combatant personnel and not "advisers" sent to assist one side. Their presence was desired by both Egypt and Israel and required congressional approval. Congress approved the stationing of American civilians in the Sinai on October 9, 1975.

¹⁰ These were not officially published by the Executive branch of the United States government.

¹¹ The 1974 and 1975 agreements were achieved without the substantial aid of other outside powers. The Russians were effectively prevented from playing the role of "spoiler" and from receiving credit for any accomplishments.

¹² Kissinger in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7, 1975, Department of State Press Release, no. 522.

"To the outsider, it seems clear that Lebanon can never be the same again. The killing and destruction have probably been too great to allow a return to the old confessional relationships and haphazard manner of running the country."

Upheaval in Lebanon

BY NORMAN HOWARD*

Analyst, United States Department of Commerce

A RELATIVELY LIBERAL, democratic and prosperous Arab republic, Lebanon erupted into prolonged and bloody civil war in 1975, her artful confessional compromise rudely shattered, her economy in ruins, her political maturity strained to the breaking point, and her future existence in doubt. As many as 10,000 Lebanese have been killed or wounded, and many more have fled the country. Beirut's commercial center has been gutted, and other Lebanese cities have sustained severe damage.

The roots of the Lebanese tragedy lie deep in the country's history as a refuge for a multiplicity of sects and in the leadership's inability to resolve the socio-political tensions inherent in a multireligious society and the tensions resulting from increasing affluence and the Arab-Israeli conflict. For more than 30 years, political stability has rested somewhat precariously on popular acceptance of the National Pact, a verbal agreement concluded in 1943 between Lebanon's Christian President and her Muslim Prime Minister. The covenant provided for an independent Lebanon, which would maintain fraternal relations with the Arab world; it also divided political and administrative posts along sectarian lines, as specified in the 1926 constitution. However, in recent years the country's social system has become more complicated and appears less amenable to regulation by arrangements drawn up 30 or 50 years ago.

CONFESSIONALISM UNDER STRESS

The Lebanese population of some 2.6 million, divided into 17 religious sects, is perhaps the least unified and most heterogeneous of any population in

the Middle East. According to the 1932 census (the only one ever taken), on which the present confessional system is based, the Christians constituted a slight majority, and the Maronite Catholics were the single largest religious group. The Muslims have grown steadily, however, and in 1975 they constituted roughly 60 percent of the population. Moreover, the presence of 250,000 to 300,000 embittered and stateless Palestinians, mostly Muslim and about one-third of them living in refugee camps, along with untold thousands of Syrian workers, gives added weight to the indigenous Muslim community. The Shias are now the largest Muslim sect, and the most underprivileged group in Lebanon. There are indications that the Sunni Muslim establishment, which has administered the country in conjunction with the Christians, fears displacement by the Shias. Since 1969, an estimated 100,000 Shias and others have fled from their southern homes in the face of mounting Israeli attacks, contributing to poverty and overcrowding in the capital and adding a volatile element to the political scene.

Since independence, the Christians, particularly the Maronites, have been guaranteed political dominance within the state apparatus. The President is a Maronite, the commander of the army and much of the officer corps are Christian, and Christians outnumber Muslim deputies in Parliament by a fixed ratio of six to five. The Muslims, then, occupy a distinctly second-class political and economic position, although the Premier is traditionally a Sunni and the speaker of Parliament is a Shia. While the sects have lived in relative harmony for long periods, a basic tension has always existed between Muslims and Christians. Cities and towns are divided into distinct religious quarters, and sectarian differences are emphasized in the private schools and by the community structures of each sect. This fragmented political and social environment contributes to the view that "people outside one's family or group are generally antagonistic."¹ Loyalty to family is para-

* The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of Commerce.

¹ Samir Khalaf, "Adaptive Modernization: The Case for Lebanon," in Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander, eds., *Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle East* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1972), p. 576.

mount; loyalty to the nation is virtually nonexistent. Lebanon's main problem thus remains the lack of agreement over her national identity—whether she is to be Arab or Lebanese, Muslim or Christian, confessional or secular, capitalist or socialist, pro-Western or closely aligned with the Arab bloc, independent or part of a larger Arab state.

In recent years, the confessional system and Maronite primacy have come under increasing criticism. Younger Lebanese, in particular, appear to be looking toward political reform. Some view secularization as the only permanent solution to recurrent sectarian strife. The political left, composed mainly but not exclusively of Muslims, has advocated the abolition of confessionalism (to be replaced by proportional, secular representation in Parliament), voting rights for 18-year-olds, and various economic and social reforms. The Najjada, a Muslim political party, has argued that the presidency should be rotated between Christian and Muslim politicians,² and other Muslims have called for the limitation of (Christian) presidential power, the creation of a council of Muslim officers to oversee the Christian army commander, and augmented authority for the (Muslim) Prime Minister. The extreme difficulty of enacting such a relatively moderate program was illustrated by the half-hearted government proposal in October, 1972, to regularize civil service working hours and to "deconfessionalize" the administration. According to Premier Saeb Salam, the plans were dropped within a few days because reform would "threaten national unity."³

BACKDROP TO CIVIL WAR

Lebanon is no stranger to political instability or violence. The country suffered through a five-month civil war in 1958, prompting United States military intervention, and was on the verge of civil war in 1969.⁴ Most large political groups maintain well-armed private militias, and blood feuds have been common. In early January, 1973, the government announced the arrest of 14 members of the Socialist Revolutionary Organization—a "leftist terrorist" group that had robbed banks, planted bombs, and conspired to murder Lebanese and foreign officials. A demonstration by tobacco farmers for higher prices led to a clash with police in which 2 men were killed

and 45 wounded. The left blamed the latter incident on the bankruptcy of the political system.

More ominous for the future were the army-Palestinian clashes of May 4–23, 1973, following the April assassination of three leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by Israeli commandos in Beirut. The crisis began after members of a radical Palestinian group kidnapped three Lebanese soldiers. President Suleiman Franjeh ordered the army, which had not opposed the Israelis, to intervene with tanks and jet aircraft, stating that the Palestinians would not be permitted to terrorize the country "as if they were above the official authority."⁵ A year later, in May, 1974, the guerrillas again battled for several days with rightists in Beirut, leaving a reported 300 dead or wounded. Clashes between rival Palestinian factions left 20 dead in late June, 1974; minor skirmishes also broke out between right-wing and Palestinian groups in July. In September, the government outlawed the public bearing of arms, to no avail, and the 15-year-old government of Takiyeddin al-Sulh, apparently unable to maintain law and order, resigned.

The year 1975 opened inauspiciously for Lebanon, with severe fighting in January at Kfar Shouba between Palestinian commandos and Israeli forces, an eight-day strike of private school teachers, and the storming of the American University of Beirut by security police to end a student siege. This heated atmosphere was conducive to further bloodshed. Security forces fired on southern villagers on January 14, during a protest against Israeli attacks. Demonstrations in Lebanon's three major cities in late February over a fishing rights dispute led to fighting in Sidon between the army and civilian "protesters," a two-week general strike in Sidon, and the deaths of some 24 persons, including leftist leader and former parliamentary deputy Maruf Saad. The stage was set for the opening round of the continuing civil war that began in April, 1975.

THE PHALANGE AND THE PALESTINIANS

The first phase of the fighting was marked by a confrontation between Palestinian guerrilla forces and 70-year-old Pierre Gemayel's Phalange, a predominantly Christian, "right-wing" Lebanese nationalist party founded in 1936. It was triggered by the shooting of a Phalange supporter and a Phalangist ambush of a Palestinian bus in a Christian suburb of Beirut on April 13 that killed 26 Palestinians. Pro-Palestinian newspapers denounced the incident as an "ugly Phalangist massacre," "sedition" against the Palestinian people, and an effort to liquidate the Palestinian revolution.⁶ Fighting subsided after four days, leaving an estimated 150 dead and 300 wounded.

The crisis reflected the government's growing par-

² *The Arab World* (Beirut), October 4, 1973.

³ *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 27 (Winter, 1973), Chronology, p. 65.

⁴ For these earlier episodes, see Fahim Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961); John B. Wolf, "Shadow on Lebanon," *Current History*, vol. 58 (January, 1970), and "Lebanon: The Politics of Survival," *Current History*, vol. 62 (January, 1972).

⁵ *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 27 (Summer, 1973), Chronology, p. 365.

⁶ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, April 15, 16, and 18, 1975.

alysis and its inability to deal with the Palestinian question. Despite Christian demands, the 15,000-man army, outnumbered by the private militias of the various contenders, did not intervene. On numerous occasions, the Phalange has accused the Palestinians of behaving as a "state within a state"; Gemayel and other Christian leaders have called for an end to the guerrilla presence in Lebanon. By using the country as a staging area for raids against Israel, the Palestinians have provoked Israeli reprisals and have raised the specter of Israeli occupation of the southern region; at the same time, the Palestinian alliance with the left has stimulated Christian fears of Muslim domination. However, the main-line Palestinian organizations, dominated by Fatah,* have generally stayed out of the civil conflict. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat thanked President Franjeh for his "positive patriotic attitude" during the April crisis,⁷ and in late April he met with the President in a further effort to calm the situation. Moreover, a joint committee of ranking Lebanese and PLO officials, initially formed after the May, 1973, disorders, met to discuss urgent problems.

On May 15, in the wake of the April emergency, Rashid al-Sulh's six-month-old government fell. The Phalangist ministers, along with former President Camille Chamoun's National Liberals, were condemning the Premier's failure to act against the guerrillas, and Kamal Jumblatt, Druze head of the Progressive Socialist party (PSP), was demanding strong measures against the Phalange. A renewal of the Palestinian-Phalange confrontation led on May 23 to the formation of a military government, headed by retired Brigadier General Nureddin al-Rifai; he quickly aroused the opposition of leftists and centrist parties, Muslims as well as Christians, and was forced to resign within three days. At the end of the month, against his will, President Franjeh designated Rashid Karami as Premier. A leader of the Tripoli Muslim community and a "bitter foe" of the President, Karami had been Premier eight times before and had played an active role in opposition to the Chamoun regime during the 1958 civil war. Before he became Premier for the ninth time, he announced his intention to run for the presidency in 1976,⁸ but he is said to retain the respect of most Christians, including the Phalangists.⁹ Karami spent five weeks putting together (on July 1) a six-man "rescue Cabinet," in-

cluding himself as Premier and defense minister and former President Chamoun as minister of the interior. As a main party to the troubles, the Phalangists were excluded from the government, partly at the insistence of Kamal Jumblatt, who was also excluded.

ESCALATION IN BEIRUT AND TRIPOLI

Karami worked no magic, however, and the government's ineffectiveness was soon revealed. Right- and left-wing forces engaged in heavy fighting for eight days in late June and early July; the Premier reported 900 dead before it stopped. It was becoming increasingly clear that both Franjeh and Karami had lost control of their respective constituencies: Franjeh himself, a lame-duck President, appeared powerless and isolated. A minor incident at the end of August sparked a week-long outbreak in Zahleh, a mountain town 25 miles east of Beirut, leaving nearly 50 dead.

The civil war entered its most destructive phase at the beginning of September, when communal strife ignited in Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city. The fighting soon spread to neighboring Zgharta, Franjeh's home town, where Christian gangs ambushed a Muslim bus on September 7, killing 12 and wounding 25. Premier Karami described the incident as "wholesale murder," "an act strange to the Lebanese nature."¹⁰ Several days later, three Maronite priests were slain in Zgharta. Tripoli's water supply and electricity were cut, and arson and looting by Christians and Muslims alike were widespread. Plainly, Lebanon's civilized façade had been breached, and barbarities were becoming commonplace. The Premier was reluctant to employ the army because of its Christian orientation and his fears of escalation; he relented only after the replacement of Major General Iskandar Ghanem on September 10 by a less controversial army commander.¹¹ The army was then ordered to Tripoli. It engaged the followers of Karami's Muslim rival, Farouk Mokaddem, killing 12 on September 15 and prompting leftist calls for a general strike. Mokaddem had reportedly assumed control in Tripoli, denouncing the army as "this fascist and reactionary force."¹² Concerned that the violence would undermine his own cause, the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat was evidently instrumental in mediating between Karami and the left and in calling off the proposed general strike. Joint Palestinian-government security forces, including members of the Syrian-based Saiqa group, helped patrol the streets.

Meanwhile, Beirut exploded into uncontrollable violence, with both the Phalange and their Muslim opponents using rockets, mortars, machine guns, grenades and dynamite. Interior Minister Chamoun reported on September 15 that "We have given security forces orders to silence any source of fire in Beirut,"¹³ but the action proved ineffective. The

* See pp. 27 ff. of this issue.

⁷ *Ibid.*, April 21, 1975.

⁸ *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, vol. 3 (May 15, 1975).

⁹ *Time*, June 9, 1975.

¹⁰ *The Washington Post*, September 8, 1975.

¹¹ Ghanem had failed to prevent the Israeli raid on Beirut in April, 1973, and had been accused of acting on behalf of the Christians in the current strife. He was replaced by Major General Hanna Said, also a Christian.

¹² *The Washington Post*, September 12, 1975.

¹³ *Ibid.*, September 17, 1975.

PSP's Jumblatt asked "all Lebanese to cease killing each other and resolve their differences through a peaceful dialogue."¹⁴ But the fighting continued in Beirut, punctuated by numerous cease-fires, and resumed in Tripoli in early October. Bodies decomposed in the streets of the capital; victims were occasionally mutilated and beheaded; officials warned of plague. The Phalangists reportedly fired entire streets of Muslim shops, while Muslim extremists repaid in kind.

The government responded by establishing a 20-man Committee of National Dialogue, evenly divided between Christians and Muslims but also reflecting heavy leftist influence in the form of the Communist party and the Baath. Significantly, the President was not represented. On October 2, Raymond Edde, a prominent Christian politician and leading contender for the presidency, and Saeb Salam, a Muslim notable, called for Franjeh's resignation. Pierre Gemayel suggested that Christians were beginning to lose faith in "the Lebanese formula," a contention supported by the extreme right's advocacy of partition into Christian and Muslim enclaves.

THE ECONOMICS OF VIOLENCE

Prior to the recent strife, Lebanon's laissez-faire, capitalist economy had been pronounced "basically sound,"¹⁵ despite manifold problems and an appalling maldistribution of wealth. During the closure of the Suez Canal (1967-1975), Beirut emerged as the Mediterranean's most important Arab port, and the resolution of the Intra Bank difficulties in 1972 contributed to an economic upswing. The economy was not severely affected by the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war, and construction, industry, and tourism (the latter accounting for an estimated 18 percent of GNP in 1974)¹⁶ all boomed during the early 1970's. In 1974, economic growth was estimated at 10 per-

cent, up from 4.5 percent in 1973, and the inflow of petrodollars was estimated at \$1.1 billion.¹⁷ Lebanon's six year development plan (1972-77) attempted to place the economy on a more rational foundation.¹⁸ Industry's growing importance was recognized in 1972 with the establishment of a Ministry of Industry; the government also invested substantial sums in agriculture. Trade and services remained dominant, however, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of GNP, and Lebanon continued to be overly dependent on the foreign sector.

The boom had its price, as inflation mounted to a conservatively estimated 11 percent in both 1973 and 1974.¹⁹ There were dozens of strikes. Workers rioted in the major cities in December, 1973; two persons were killed in Tripoli. Despite the glitter, Lebanon's poor suffered grievously. Low-cost public housing was virtually nonexistent, and the public health service was also inadequate. Moreover, public needs could not be financed easily, as tax evasion had reached scandalous proportions. The country's primary economic problems remained that of achieving "a more equitable distribution . . . without impairing growth and prosperity."²⁰

Civil war temporarily ended hopes of economic reform. Commercial life in Beirut and Tripoli ceased during the fighting; many shops and factories were damaged or destroyed; and foreign as well as Lebanese businessmen left the country in growing numbers. At least a dozen American companies evacuated personnel or dependents. The capital itself was in danger of losing its preeminence as a major Arab financial center; it was already under challenge from the Arab oil producers. Receipts from tourism fell disastrously. Estimates of economic losses through September, 1975, although widely divergent, were staggering, ranging from \$1.3 billion to nearly \$5 billion.²¹

THE ISRAELI CONNECTION

Lebanon's main external problem is her confrontation with Israel over the Palestinian guerrilla presence. This confrontation has also altered Lebanon's internal political balance and has threatened to set off another Middle East war. Until recently, Lebanon was not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli struggle. But she permitted the main commando groups to establish headquarters in Beirut, and she was unable to prevent guerrillas from raiding into Israel. A commando-government agreement of January, 1972, supplementing an agreement of 1969, reportedly gave the government a veto over operations that might provoke Israeli reprisals. But these accords were not effective in regulating the guerrilla presence. Prudently, Lebanon did not participate in the October, 1973 war; nonetheless, guerrilla activity increased during and after the conflict. When the

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, September 18, 1975.

¹⁵ *The Economist* (London), January 26, 1974.

¹⁶ *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1975.

¹⁷ *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, vol. 3 (August 1, 1975).

¹⁸ For an analysis of the plan, see Hamdi F. Aly and Nabil Abdun-Nur, "An Appraisal of the Six Year Plan of Lebanon (1972-1977)," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 29 (Spring, 1975).

¹⁹ Samir A. Makdisi, "London: Monetary Developments, Management and Performance in the Postwar Period Up to 1972, Part I," in *ibid.* (Winter, 1975); also, *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 17, 1975. *MERIP Reports*, no. 30 (August, 1974), estimated the inflation in prices of consumer goods at 24-29 percent in 1973.

²⁰ Albert Y. Badre, "Economic Development of Lebanon," in Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 200.

²¹ For various estimates, see *Middle East Economic Digest*, April 25, 1975; *The Economist*, September 13, 1975; *Time*, September 22, 1975; *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1975; *Newsweek*, October 6, 1975; and Irene L. Gendizer, "Lebanon: Mosaic of Hostilities," *The Nation*, September 27, 1975.

war ended, Premier Takieddin al-Sulh visited Damascus to express his "complete support" for Syria, while Foreign Minister Fuad Naffa described his government's policy as favoring total Israeli evacuation of Arab territories, including the return of Arab Jerusalem, and recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination.²² Palestinian statehood might provide a convenient means of ridding Lebanon of an otherwise insoluble refugee problem.

Lebanon's military impotence has permitted Israel a virtually free hand in the south. Since the October war, Israeli attacks have occurred almost daily. The impact on life in southern Lebanon has been devastating. Heavy air raids in May, 1974, destroyed much of the Nabatieh refugee camp, killing as many as 80 Palestinians and wounding 200.²³ Further air raids in July destroyed houses in other camps, killed a number of civilians, and set fire to olive groves and wheat fields. In December, 1974, Israeli planes bombed "commando training sites" on the southern edge of the capital and strafed nearby refugee camps.²⁴ An Israeli ground force engaged Palestinians at the village of Kfar Shouba and on Mount Hermon's southwestern slopes for six days in January, 1975, prompting Lebanon to request a Joint Arab Defense Council meeting to deal with the deteriorating situation. In a series of attacks in May, 1975, Israeli troops abducted nine southerners and attacked a border village, killing at least seven Lebanese soldiers.

The raids continued throughout the summer of 1975, with an air, land, and sea attack on southern villages and an air attack on a refugee camp near Sidon in July. According to United Nations figures, the latter action destroyed 227 homes, damaged 330 others, and rendered 1,393 homeless.²⁵ Further raids in August reportedly killed 18 persons near Tyre, including 4 Lebanese army officers, and 12 persons in a refugee camp near the Syrian border. Israel reportedly increased the raids in an effort to prevent the guerrillas from sabotaging the Sinai negotiations between Israel and Egypt. According to Israeli sources, the military was conducting a "systematic campaign of preventive warfare rather than direct

retaliatory actions."²⁶ Israel may also have been taking advantage of the anarchy in Lebanon to settle accounts personally with the Palestinians.²⁷

The Lebanese and Arab reaction has been almost entirely verbal. Lebanon protested to the United Nations Security Council in January, 1975, "against Israel's repeated and condemnable acts of aggression" and her "campaign of terror" in the south.²⁸ She has repeatedly charged Israel with attempting to depopulate the south as a prelude to invasion and occupation up to the Litani River. On various occasions, Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have proffered military aid. In a meeting between Franjieh and Syrian President Hafez Assad on January 7, 1975, Assad expressed Syria's willingness to grant Lebanese requests for aid against Israeli attacks. A mutual defense pact with Syria of some symbolic importance was also signed. Nonetheless, the Lebanese, wary of Arab military involvement and fearful of Israeli escalation, have restricted the Arab role to technical, financial, and diplomatic support.

SYRIA AND OTHER ARABS

The Syrians have become crucial to Lebanese domestic stability; their rapprochement with Lebanon, reflected in the "great and historic meeting" between Franjieh and Assad, appears to reflect Syrian concern over Israeli threats to occupy south Lebanon. Syria views herself as the protector of the Lebanese Muslim community and perhaps hopes ultimately to absorb Lebanon into a Greater Syria.²⁹ However, Syria sees in the Lebanese civil war a distraction from her own diplomacy, and she has restrained both the Lebanese left and the commandos. Syria's Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam has mediated in each major round of fighting, declaring optimistically in September, 1975, that "We will not leave Lebanon until the crisis is solved, even if we have to stay a month."³⁰

Other Arab states have been peripherally involved in the country's byzantine internal struggle. Wider Arab interest in the conflict was symbolized by the April, 1975, mission to Beirut of Mahmoud Riyad, secretary general of the Arab League, evidently at the request of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. On arrival, Riyad referred to the "regrettable and painful incidents which . . . were a shock to the Arab world. We must prevent a recurrence of the spilling of Arab blood by an Arab hand. . . ."³¹ Saudi Arabia

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²² Statement to Parliament's foreign relations committee, *The Arab World*, November 16, 1973.

²³ *The Washington Post* (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak), May 22, 1974.

²⁴ *The Washington Evening Star*, December 12, 1974.

²⁵ *The Washington Post*, August 21, 1975.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, September 8, 1975.

²⁷ See *Time*, July 14, 1975, pp. 31-32, for an account of one covert Israeli mission into Lebanon; also, *The New York Times*, October 5, 1975.

²⁸ *The New York Times*, January 17, 1975.

²⁹ *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, vol. 3 (June 1, 1975); *The New York Times*, October 5, 1975.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, September 22, 1975.

³¹ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, April 15, 1975.

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"If all works out according to the American-backed Israeli plan, Israel's leaders anticipate a new era of security based on an overwhelming Israeli military superiority in the face of any possible combination of enemies."

Israel's Year of Decision

BY DWIGHT JAMES SIMPSON

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BY THE AUTUMN of 1975, it was unmistakably clear that there have been at least three major changes in the state of Israel. First, through death or retirement, the last phase of the "changing of the old guard" is over. David Ben-Gurion, Pinhas Sapir, Golda Meir, and others from the small band of East European Jews who founded and guided Israel since 1948 have been replaced by men who are younger and substantially different in style and in outlook. The clearest example is in the office of Prime Minister. The post was held for many years by David Ben-Gurion, who was born in Poland and educated in Turkey, a cosmopolitan, but a committed Zionist, an ideological Socialist, a deeply religious man who constantly quoted Scriptures, and who brought to public life many of the charismatic qualities of an Old Testament prophet. The present Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, is a "Sabra," an Israeli provincial, the first professional military officer to serve as Prime Minister and the first to speak Hebrew as his native tongue. Rabin is secular; he is not involved with the passions that motivated the Zionist pioneers; fundamentally he is a technocrat, more at home with cost-benefit analysis and computer print-outs than with the impassioned rhetoric and moral exhortations so commonplace among members of the "old guard."

With the change in the quality of Israeli political leadership has come another change of far-reaching consequences. Before the nearly catastrophic October War of 1973, the "fourth round" of the endless Palestine War that has lasted a generation, Israelis were convinced that their military and technological superiority to neighboring Arab states could be regarded as a permanent condition of Middle Eastern life. If the Arabs could never close the military and technological gap, because of alleged cultural, social and personal deficiencies widespread in the Arab world, then the Israelis, so the reasoning went, had only to stand firm and wait for the Arabs to accept

the inevitable, peace on what would be primarily Israeli terms.

During the 1973 war, this Israeli perception of superiority suffered severe strain. Evidence from the battlefields was conclusive proof that the Egyptian army, for example, was a formidable fighting machine, capable of inflicting grave damage on its Israeli opponents. The October War also seemed to demonstrate that the military or technological gap had been greatly narrowed by means of a dramatically rapid and continuing Arab progress. Consequently, a comfortable assumption about any future war's strategy, that time is on the Israeli side, was a military casualty in the Sinai Desert. The number of actual military casualties was alarming; in three weeks of combat 2,600 Israelis were killed and approximately 10,000 were wounded. Proportionate to her population, Israel's losses in the brief October War were far heavier than American losses in a decade of war in Indochina.

The third major change, also resulting from the October War, was the damage to the image of the leaders of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and to the image of the politicians to whom the forces are answerable. The Agranat Commission, appointed by the Cabinet to inquire into the state of the IDF readiness for the war, and to evaluate the strategic and tactical steps taken after the fighting began, issued its report in April, 1974. The commission, popularly known by the name of its chairman, Shimon Agranat, president of the Israeli Supreme Court, used judicious and restrained language; nonetheless it leveled some serious charges. These included the charge that the IDF's Supreme Command misread or ignored the ample intelligence data that the war was about to commence. The chief of staff, Lieutenant General David Eleazar, a hero of the Six Day War of 1967, came in for blunt criticisms of incompetence, complacency and indecisiveness. Similarly, the director of Military Intelligence, Major

General Eliyahu Ze'ira, was made to bear major responsibility for the near disaster. The commission flatly recommended that both officers, and several of their ranking subordinates, be removed from their positions.

The Agranat Commission's report on the political context of military decisions taken or not taken reflected most unfavorably on Golda Meir, then Prime Minister, and on Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defense. While gathering testimony, the Commission had asked both political leaders if their decisions, which resulted in a delayed mobilization of military reserves, were influenced by the fact that the general elections for the Knesset were to be held at the end of October, 1973. Both Meir and Dayan denied this, and the commission accepted their denials. But the mere fact that the Commission had raised the question seemed to tarnish the reputations of Meir and Dayan. The popular response to this painful and painstaking investigation was a markedly changed perception on the part of important sectors of the Israeli public with regard to both politicians and generals.

Captain Motti Ashkenazi, with a spotless record as a junior officer during the Sinai battles of 1973, functioned as the symbol of massive popular discontent with the military and political establishment. In early 1974, Captain Ashkenazi marched in lonely vigil outside Prime Minister Golda Meir's office protesting the way the war had been handled. Almost immediately the young officer was joined by tens of thousands of other protesters from all over the country. This unprecedented popular protest finally forced Golda Meir and her Cabinet to resign, a dramatic event that was a milestone in Israel's brief life as a nation. Golda Meir, known unofficially as "Everybody's Jewish grandmother," and Moshe Dayan, a veritable folk hero of Israeli life, were summarily turned out of office. Meir's political career was ended; Dayan's was seriously impaired. Moreover, the previously sacrosanct IDF, which had always been above criticism, suffered a precipitous drop in public esteem. Once selfless, ruthlessly efficient and (most important) speedily victorious, the IDF was now seen as a rather muscle-bound bureaucratic organization sometimes unable to interpret its own intelligence data or to provide clear and resourceful leadership in time of crisis. And, worst of all, the IDF was shown to be a body subject to serious political constraints stemming from electoral politics.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Given this framework of changed conditions and changed perceptions, the pivotal problem in Israel today is the economy. Israel's economic difficulties were intensified by the October War. In November, 1974, the government imposed an austerity budget

and devalued the Israeli pound by 40 percent. Taxes were increased, especially income and excise taxes, and government subsidies on some basic foodstuffs were sharply reduced. The immediate result of these draconian measures was a new phenomenon in Israeli life: mass protests and street riots in Israel's major cities. Figures released by the government in early 1975 told the grim story. The general consumer price index had risen in 1974 by 60 percent. Foodstuffs had risen by 83 percent, gasoline by 141 percent, natural gas by 155 percent, electricity by 117 percent, and water by 115 percent. Skyrocketing prices, coupled with sharply increased taxes and a seriously devalued currency, meant that the average Israeli was experiencing a rapid and drastic decline in living standards.

Presenting the government's draft budget for 1975-1976 to the Knesset in February, 1975, Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz described a national economy that had indeed reached the peril point. He noted that in 1974 the deficit on Israel's balance of payments totaled over \$3,500 million—nearly half of Israel's Gross National Product (GNP), approximately \$7,800 million, for the same period. No nation can long sustain such massive foreign indebtedness. Rabinowitz noted that the monetary cost to Israel of the October War alone had been almost the equivalent of a year's GNP. Insofar as the new budget was concerned, the minister calculated that about 40 percent was to be allocated to national defense. This meant that in the current fiscal year more than one-third of the Israeli GNP is devoted to military spending. Payment for past wars and the costs of preparation for future wars dominate Israel's national life.

Finance Minister Rabinowitz dealt the already stunned Israeli citizens another heavy blow in October, 1975, when he announced a new 10 percent currency devaluation (the fifth in less than a year), the raising of some consumer prices by as much as 22 percent, and the imposition of a new sales tax of 10 percent. After this announcement, Rabinowitz was quoted by Israeli Radio as telling a parliamentary economic committee that the government was pursuing "a policy of economic brinkmanship as there was no alternative."

Because of widespread war-weariness, sharply declining living standards, and massive popular dissatisfaction with the country's political and military leadership, Israelis have begun to "vote with their feet," and are leaving the country in significant numbers. The "voting" is not limited to dissatisfied Israeli citizens, but includes Jews elsewhere, recently thought to be potential immigrants, who are choosing instead to settle in other countries. According to figures released by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of immigrants to Israel in 1975

is about the same as the number of Israeli citizens emigrating: 20,000 people entering and 20,000 leaving. The current condition was preceded by several years of sharply declining Jewish immigration to the "Promised Land." In 1974, immigration to Israel from all sources totaled 32,000, compared with 55,000 in 1973, a 42 percent decline.

The main reason for the lower overall immigration was the decline in the number of Jews arriving from the Soviet Union. After Soviet emigration restrictions were eased in early 1971, Soviet Jews had formed the majority of immigrants to Israel. (It is noteworthy that the six million Jews of the United States, whose political and economic support of Israel has been massive, provide very little immigration.) Whereas about 32,000 Soviet Jews went to Israel in 1973, in 1974 the figure dropped to 16,500. In the first three months of 1975, 2,400 Jews arrived in Israel from the Soviet Union, and this rate appears to have been maintained throughout 1975.

In February, 1975, Soviet authorities denied Israeli allegations that official harassment was to blame for the dramatic decline in Jewish emigration, and declared that the number of applications for exit visas had dropped sharply in 1974; in early 1975, only 1,420 applications were pending. Israeli authorities hotly rejected the Soviet explanation; they charged that the Soviet government had intensified its harassment of Jewish emigrants, and that there were at least 140,000 visa applications pending. This Israeli interpretation was accepted without much question in the United States and was published widely in the American press throughout 1975.

Another major reason for the decline of immigration to Israel is far less subject to dispute, but has been publicly ignored by the Israeli government and, with one or two exceptions, by the American press. By mid-1975, figures collected by various governments, primarily American and West European, showed that more than 40 percent of the Russian Jews who left the Soviet Union had chosen to settle in countries other than Israel, notably in the United States, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. The most striking and historically poignant example of this diverted immigration was the fact that 500 Jews of Soviet origin had joined the 5,000-member Jewish community in West Berlin by December, 1974; by mid-1975, the West Berlin Senate decided that, unless special factors were applicable, Russian Jewish immigrants would not be permitted to remain. The West Berlin Senate reasoned that Russian Jews had been encouraged and assisted by the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency to go to Israel, and that the United States had pressured the Soviet Union to facilitate this emigration. But although significant numbers of Jews left the Soviet Union, nearly half did not go to Israel, but sought to settle permanently

in West Berlin and elsewhere. To an already badly overcrowded West Berlin, this was not only paradoxical but also unacceptable.

In 1974, the Pori Institute of Tel Aviv, a private research organization, conducted an extensive poll about Israeli emigration, and the results were published in the mass circulation newspaper, *Haaretz*. The survey showed that nearly 12 percent of the adults in Israel were seriously considering emigrating to another country, and that of these, nearly 7 percent had decided to leave. Another widely discussed study showed that the Pori Institute figures did not tell the entire story. In the journal *Davar* (March 20, 1974), Shimson Ofer began a series of articles based on an intensive study of the emigration question. He concluded that it is impossible to know how many emigrants have left Israel in the last few years, because there is no unequivocal definition of the word "emigrant" for statistical purposes. For some time, it has not been necessary for an Israeli citizen to have a special visa or exit permit to leave the country. Moreover, only a minority of those who left declared that they were leaving permanently, and thus defined themselves as emigrants. Hence there is no way of knowing whether the great numbers of people who are leaving the country are emigrants or tourists.

It is understandable that the Israeli government fears the overall, long-term effects of this pattern of population flow. The Arab and Jewish birth and death rates and the prevailing pattern of Jewish immigration and emigration must change quickly and dramatically; otherwise the Arabs will outnumber Jews within the area under present Israeli control by the end of this century. A permanent Jewish minority in Israel would be politically almost unmanageable; it would also undermine the *raison d'être* for the existence of Israel. Chaim Weizmann, one of Israel's founders in 1948, and her first president, had set the tone when he declared that the Zionists' purpose was to create in Palestine a home for Jews which would be "as Jewish as England is English or France is French." The political state of Israel was based squarely on this principle of religious separateness and numerical superiority.

ISRAELI SUCCESSES

In two major areas, Israel has recently achieved considerable success. In Washington, D.C., the active, powerful, and very effective American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which is registered as a domestic lobby with both houses of Congress, has been instrumental in influencing policy makers and in shaping legislation. The director of this organization is Morris Amitay, an American citizen with great expertise who is assisted by a large, well-financed staff. Amitay's organization was mainly

responsible for rounding up 76 members of the Senate in early 1975 to sign a petition calling on the Ford administration to be "fully responsive" to Israel's economic and security needs.

The ease with which the lobby could persuade more than three-fourths of the Senate to accede to its position is impressive. In a rare interview with *The New York Times* (August 8, 1975), Amitay was quoted as saying that "what is good for Israel is good for the United States. We stick by it. We are effective as a lobby because we've got a lot of people we can call on immediately." He also noted with some pride, "we've never lost on a major issue." Major issues are counted as the continuance of large military and economic appropriations for Israel—invariably larger than the administration requests—and other important questions involving Israel's security. Amitay expressed great confidence about the future of his lobby, regardless of the issues. He noted, "We have been systematically visiting the freshman class of 91 Congressmen and the 10 new men in the Senate. Our relations are very friendly."

It is no exaggeration to say that the so-called Israel lobby in Washington, spearheaded by Amitay's committee, is the most powerful special interest group at work in the field of American foreign policy. And it is surely a most remarkable success for Israel. She has achieved an influence that practically guarantees that any Israeli goal will have American support.

The second major success for Israel is, of course, the so-called "Sinai agreements," which were initiated by Egypt and Israel and were coming into effect at the time this study was written. The specific details of the agreements included a substantial enlargement of the United Nations buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Egyptian territory of Sinai; a withdrawal by Israel from a smaller amount of Egyptian territory, which included the Abu Rudeis oil fields and the western approaches to the Gidi and Mitla Passes through the western Sinai Mountains; the stationing of 200 American electronic surveillance specialists in three separate stations in the Gidi and Mitla region; the agreement by both Egypt and Israel pledging the two countries to resolve disputes by peaceful means.

Referring to these specifics, United States President Gerald Ford described them as "a great achievement, one of the most historic certainly of this decade and perhaps of this century," a judgment with which his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was quick to agree. Overlooking the tendency of American politicians to resort to hyperbole, from the Israeli standpoint the Sinai agreements could, if all parts of the agreements are fulfilled, be a quite astonishing success. First of all, if fulfilled, the agreements will permanently neutralize Egypt and split her from those Arab forces, particularly Syria and the Palestinians, which

might be a threat to Israel's future security. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has apparently decided (based in part on his legitimate expectation of massive American economic aid to his country) to detach Egypt from the ranks of the Arabs arrayed against Israel and to take his country out of the Palestine War, in which Egypt has been heavily involved since 1948. If Sadat survives politically, and all goes according to plan, Israel will have achieved a great breakthrough. The remaining military combination of Syria and the Palestinian guerrillas, although potentially troublesome, will not seriously imperil Israel's military security.

It seemed obvious that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin knew that the Sinai agreements have already split the Arab ranks when he addressed his nation on Radio Israel in early September, 1975. Rabin flatly declared that there was "virtually no chance" of any Israeli agreement with Syria comparable to what the agreement achieved with Egypt. Rabin based his judgment on the presence of Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights area conquered from Syria in 1967. The Prime Minister stated: "In an agreement [with Syria] none of us even imagines adversely affecting any existing [Israeli] settlement on the Golan Heights."

These settlements are paramilitary outposts, part of the Israeli defense system. In total, there are between 10 and 15 settlements there, with a total population of about 1,500. Their existence is part of a long-established Israeli policy of *fait accompli* in the occupied territories of Sinai, Jerusalem, Gaza, West Bank and Golan. The Israelis establish settlements, construct roads, even establish primitive tourist facilities in all the occupied Arab territories in order to "create facts" with which the Arabs or outside conciliators will have to deal. In his radio speech of September, Rabin went on to say that the room to maneuver for an agreement in the Syrian Golan would be sharply restricted by the very existence of the newly established Israeli paramilitary settlements. He said that no Israeli evacuation of occupied Syrian territory beyond a few hundred meters was thus possible. He argued, in effect, that the Israeli occupation of captured Syrian territory was the reason why the Israeli occupation could not be ended. However deficient this official Israeli explanation may be from the standpoint of logic and common sense, it accurately reflected the new power realities in the aftermath of the Sinai agreements. In effect, Rabin was explaining to the Syrians, Israel

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"Sadat is beset by mounting domestic troubles and heedful of the need to cater to those groups on whom he rests his power. He is sensitive to the conflicting tugs from turbulent and powerful forces in the Arab world, but he is convinced that he has already obtained more from encouraging Kissinger's diplomacy and the direct involvement of the United States than he could hope to garner from another war. Thus Sadat is a man endlessly in search of more attractive political and economic options."

Egypt Since the October War

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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THE PERIOD since the October, 1973, Middle East war has been one of far-reaching diplomatic and economic challenge for Egypt. The war ended on an anxious note militarily; the Egyptian Third Army was surrounded and in danger of destruction, and the United States and the Soviet Union were on the threshold of a possible confrontation. Politically, however, it was an indisputable triumph for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Sadat enhanced his prestige at home; for the first time since Gamal Abdel Nasser's death, he was acknowledged as a leader in his own right. He returned the Arab-Israeli conflict to the center of the international stage and forced the United States to bend its efforts toward a solution satisfactory to the Arabs. He also demonstrated the effectiveness of his diplomacy in the Arab world, obtaining the support of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal for the use of oil as a weapon and ending the almost 20 years of intermittent hostility between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he enlisted the financial assistance of the oil-rich Arabs, who had heretofore been cool to Egypt because of Nasser's pretensions toward establishing Egyptian influence in the Persian Gulf and on the Arabian peninsula. Sadat also put Israel on the defensive, puncturing the myth of her invincibility and isolating her internationally. Finally, he adroitly exploited both the United States and the Soviet Union to defend and advance Egyptian interests.

In planning and waging the October War, Sadat proved himself a masterful tactician. Egypt was made ready for war even though the economy was in difficulty and shortages were endemic. Close and effective military cooperation with Syria (which had always eluded Nasser) was established. Saudi Arabia's suspicions of Egypt's ambitions in the Arab world

were dispelled and Saudi funds financed the purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union. Sadat also maintained a working relationship with the Soviet Union (notwithstanding the expulsion of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in July, 1972) that ensured an adequate flow of arms before and throughout the October War.

Since the war, Sadat's policies have occasioned a drastic change in Egypt's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. The implications of the change relate not merely to the realm of foreign policy, but to Egyptian domestic developments as well.

CAIRO'S OPENING TO WASHINGTON

Once the fighting stopped on the Sinai front on October 25, 1973, and the threat of a Soviet-American confrontation passed, Sadat acted quickly to improve his relations with Washington. He was convinced that the United States held the key to a full Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory and was angered by what he regarded as Moscow's less than forthright support for the Arab cause. On October 29, Sadat sent Ismail Fahmy, his acting foreign minister, to Washington, D.C., to prepare the way for United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Cairo, the implementation of the United Nations cease-fire, and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States, which had been broken by Cairo after the June, 1967, war.

After a first-stage military disengagement was arranged under United Nations auspices in January, 1974, Kissinger began working to negotiate a further pullback of Israeli forces in the Sinai; in late May, 1974, he effected a limited disengagement and a cease-fire between Israel and Syria on the Golan

Heights. Sadat spoke glowingly and frequently of Kissinger and made it clear that he intended to drop Egypt's eggs into America's basket. He encouraged closer ties with the United States and invited the United States and Great Britain to take the lead in clearing the Suez Canal. United States President Richard Nixon was received in Egypt with great enthusiasm in June, 1974, as Sadat went out of his way to make unmistakable his preference for a normalization of relations with the United States and a comparable diminution of Soviet-Egyptian ties. Like most foreign leaders, Sadat was stunned and confused by Nixon's forced resignation, but he maintained a continuity of contact through Kissinger, and a year later he met with President Gerald Ford in Salzburg, Austria.

Throughout 1974 and early 1975, Kissinger labored for a second-stage disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Although he failed in March, 1975, he succeeded in September, 1975, after persuading the United States Congress to sanction a direct United States involvement in the promotion of an Egyptian-Israeli settlement within the broader framework of an Arab-Israeli settlement. In the face of growing criticism from Syria, Algeria, and the Palestinians, Sadat upheld the validity of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy.

The Sinai Agreement between Egypt and Israel, negotiated by Kissinger and formally accepted by Israel on October 10, 1975, gives Egypt several tangible benefits.* By February, 1976, Egypt is to regain possession of the oilfields at Ras Sudar and Abu Rudeis, located along the upper eastern half of the Sinai peninsula. Israel also agreed to pull back her forces to the eastern ends of the Mitla and Gidi passes, the key strategic routes dominating most of the Sinai peninsula, thus returning to Egypt an additional 1,900 square miles of territory. Finally, the United States will help Egypt build an early warning system at the eastern termini of the passes, to guard against any surprise Israeli attack. Specifically, the Sinai Agreement calls for the following:

1. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. . . . Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
2. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Gidi Passes. . . . These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic-sensor fields at both ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from these stations.

* For the complete text of the agreement, see pp. 33ff.

For their part, the Egyptians have given private assurances that non-military cargoes destined for Israel and carried in non-Israeli ships will be permitted to transit the Suez Canal; that Egypt will not blockade the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which leads into the Red Sea; and that the accord, and the cease-fire that is an integral part of it, will remain in effect for at least three years and will be operative until it is superseded by a new agreement. The vehement opposition of the Palestinians and Syrians, among others, derives from Article I of the Sinai Agreement, which stipulates that the conflict between Egypt and Israel "and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means." Arab critics allege that Sadat has defected from the fight against Israel. Criticism may well widen and intensify if Kissinger is unable to bring about a further disengagement on the Syrian front and if he does not show some progress in coping with the festering, dangerous, and complex issue of the Palestinians.

Sadat's visit to the United States in late October, 1975, the first by an Egyptian Head of State, highlighted the improvement in Egyptian-American relations since the October War. While entailing a measure of political risk for Sadat in his relations with the Arab "confrontation" states, the visit should bring tangible returns. From July, 1974, to June, 1975, Egypt received approximately \$400 million in security-support assistance and foodstuffs from the United States; in the fiscal years ahead, Sadat no doubt expects even greater amounts of United States aid, including even certain kinds of military equipment. By involving Washington directly in the process of negotiating a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, he has wrought a major reversal in American policy. The degree to which his expectations on this crucial matter are realized will have a profound effect on his policy toward the Soviet Union and on his position at home.

STRAINS WITH MOSCOW

The deterioration in Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union is directly attributable to Sadat. The general reasons that prompted his abrupt turnabout are known, though the importance assigned to individual factors involved remains subject to continuing speculation. Thus, Sadat was angered by Moscow's insistence, during the heat of battle, for a \$200-million dollar payment in hard currency (which was made for him by President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria) for the Soviet arms being delivered. On numerous occasions since the October War, he has charged that the U.S.S.R. was not as forthcoming with weapons as it should have been and that it has not fulfilled its contractual obligations since then. Having gone to war to make his point for an American intervention to pressure Israel, he calculated that

he could expect more from Washington than from Moscow; in addition, Sadat thoroughly dislikes the Russians, a sentiment that dates back to the early 1960's.

Moscow was undoubtedly infuriated by Sadat's public admonitions and revelations. It had cause to be, in light of the assistance that it did provide and its readiness to risk a confrontation with the United States to protect Egypt from another potentially crushing defeat when Israeli troops established a solid bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army. Yet, with few exceptions, Moscow has chosen not to reply in kind. One exception came on the eve of Sadat's visit to the United States, when *Pravda* criticized the Sinai Agreement and emphasized Sadat's increasing isolation in the Arab world as a consequence of his veering toward the United States.

Sadat's dissatisfaction with Soviet arms deliveries predates the October War, though his criticisms have intensified since then. Throughout 1974, Sadat maintained that Soviet leaders were denying him arms, refusing to replenish his supplies or to replace weapons lost in the fighting. Moreover, he accused Soviet leaders of using arms "as an instrument of leverage," trying to force him to end his policy of improving relations with the United States. By pleading serious shortages of weapons and blaming the Soviets, Sadat tried to neutralize the argument of those Arab and domestic critics who wanted him to resume the fight against Israel and to end his reliance on Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy. He also knew that criticism of Moscow would please Washington, and would thus facilitate his goal of obtaining U.S. support.

True, the arms imbroglio has some validity, but there is reason to believe that Sadat has deliberately exaggerated its seriousness and his military plight. There is a body of informed opinion—Egyptian and non-Egyptian—that maintains that the Soviet Union provided Egypt with sufficient weapons before and during the October War to bring about a new diplomatic environment. Even in 1974, when Sadat's complaints about Soviet neglect were strongest, Egypt obtained considerable quantities of basic weapons from a variety of sources, for example, from Syria, Algeria, France, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, after January, 1975, Sadat acknowledged receiving some arms shipments again directly from the Soviet Union. He knows that, for the foreseeable future at least, Soviet arms are indispensable and that this requires a minimal working relationship with Moscow.

For a time, until the late spring of 1975, Egyptian-Soviet relations suffered because Sadat refused to yield to Moscow's pressure to reconvene the Geneva Conference. Soviet leaders believed that a multi-

lateral approach to a Middle East settlement would regularize their role in the area. Soviet writers pressed the issue. For example, in July, 1974, the editor of *Izvestia* wrote:

The Soviet Union believes in the Geneva Conference as a basic tool for bringing about a settlement in the Middle East. The Conference must therefore resume the full range of its efforts.

But since the conference's adjournment in December, 1973, Sadat has refused to be pinned down to a date for its reconvening. Moreover, in recent months, Moscow, too, has backed away. After trying unsuccessfully to persuade the Israelis and the Palestinians to agree to return to Geneva, Moscow realized that to press for the conference in the face of intransigence on the part of two key participants would serve only to turn the forum into a brawling propaganda match. This would not contribute to Soviet prestige in the Arab world. Soviet party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev stands to lose from a conference that shows the U.S.S.R. incapable of delivering what its closest Arab clients want.

Moscow's unwillingness to honor Egypt's request for a ten-year moratorium on debt repayment (about \$200 million to \$300 million a year, similar to the moratorium granted Syria in 1974) is another reason for the deterioration in Egyptian-Soviet relations. Sadat acknowledges the debts, but requests a period of grace to help tide Egypt over the very difficult years ahead; he has asked the Soviet leadership several times to appreciate Egypt's special circumstances. However, Moscow has been obdurate. In July, 1975, fearful that Sadat intended to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May, 1971, the Soviet Union agreed to receive a delegation headed by Egypt's finance minister. Weeks of intensive discussions failed to break the deadlock, and the issue festers on, a symptom of an underlying political malaise whose development depends on the evolving condition of Egyptian-American relations.

In October, 1974, when Brezhnev agreed to visit Cairo in January, 1975, the end of the period of tension seemed imminent. In October, 1967, Brezhnev had agreed to visit Egypt in January, 1968, but affairs in East Europe and displeasure with Nasser had led to a last minute substitution of First Deputy Chairman Kiril T. Mazurov for Brezhnev, a slight Cairo quietly accepted since Egypt was then completely dependent on Soviet protection and assistance. Nasser had been miffed, but kept silent. After all, Moscow was then Egypt's only source of weapons; in 1969-1970, the Soviet Union bailed Nasser out of the "war of attrition" that he had started but could not finish. More than seven years after his original acceptance of the Egyptian government's invitation, Brezhnev set a date for a visit

to Cairo. The proposed 1975 visit was interpreted as a concession to Sadat, whose previous transgressions (for example, the July, 1972, expulsion of Soviet military personnel) were being overlooked, as was his assiduous courtship of Washington. But at the last minute Brezhnev canceled the visit, supposedly because of ill health. While health may have been a factor, it alone could not explain the abrupt cancellation of the trip. At the heart of the matter is a combination of deep-rooted and persisting political, military, and economic differences.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Egypt's perennial problems weigh heavily on Sadat's decisions in foreign policy. An ever growing population that Egypt is less and less able to sustain in each passing year, bureaucracies swollen with superfluous workers whose productivity is low, reforms that are rarely implemented and rarely affect the mass of the population for whom they are supposedly intended, rising illiteracy and social stagnation, and an inflation rate of 30 percent—these are the domestic realities that loom large in Sadat's thinking. Ninety-seven percent of Egypt's land is desert, completely unsuitable for cultivation. The population of approximately 40 million is increasing by about three percent a year—one of the highest rates in the world. Egypt's economic situation is precarious and Sadat is eager for foreign investment to help provide jobs for his people.

As Sadat himself related in a speech on August 28, 1974, Egypt's difficult economic condition was one of the key factors that impelled him to war in October, 1973:

Securing a loaf of bread in 1974 was not on the horizon. We had debts due for payment in December according to international regulations, and there was no way we could repay them. We did not have one mil's worth of hard currency. This was one of the factors which contributed to my decision to go to war, because if 1974 were to come with us in that state, Israel would not have needed to fire a single shot.

Egypt was bailed out by the oil-rich Arab countries with a gift of \$500 million, but only after she went to war:

You must realize that it was not possible for us to get one dollar of this Arab aid before we wrote the heroic story of the crossing with our blood. During the first week after the October battle, the Arab brothers sent us this aid.

The wealthy Arab countries have helped Sadat, but in Cairo the reaction is more bitter than grateful. Caustic comments are directed against Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Persian Gulf Sheiks:

We fought, lost thousands of lives, and by so doing made it possible for them to quadruple the price of oil and become fantastically rich overnight—without lifting

a finger. But our Arab brethren are tight-fisted when it comes to sharing their unearned wealth with us.

During a visit in late January, 1975, the Saudi Arabian monarch gave Egypt a gift of \$100 million to purchase needed foodstuffs. Egyptians compared this "pittance" with the \$1-billion credit that the Shah of Iran—no Arab—granted at the time of his visit a few weeks earlier. In the summer of 1975, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did make available a long-term credit of \$1.1 billion for Sadat to use as economic exigencies require. However, Egypt's needs are great: the government spends nearly that much each year to import enough food to feed Egypt's burgeoning population. What Egyptians would like is an Arab "Marshall Plan," a generous, long-term commitment to promote economic recovery and industrialization. Yet there is little prospect of such an initiative coming from Egypt's Arab allies.

Egyptians find the explanation for Arab reluctance in the transitory nature of alignments in the Arab world and the incessant intriguing that goes on behind the rhetoric of Arab unity. Saudi Arabia does not want to build up Egypt, fearing that once again, as in the Nasser period, Egypt might try to undermine Saudi Arabia's monarchical system and establish herself as the leader of the Arab world. King Khalid, who succeeded Faisal in March, 1975, when Faisal was assassinated, is prepared to subsidize a war with Israel and to keep Egypt economically afloat, but not to help Egypt to industrialize. An impoverished Egypt cannot afford an ambitious foreign policy. Iran, on the other hand, would like to see a strong Egypt, independent of the Soviet Union and linked to the Western World.

For her part, Egypt needs peace, but the government also prepares for war. The streets of Cairo are filled with men in uniform. Without peace, Egypt cannot attract the Western or Arab capital that is essential for the expansion of productive enterprises in the Suez Canal zone. Affluent Arabs buy real estate and build luxury apartment houses in Cairo and Alexandria, but they invest most of their wealth elsewhere. When it comes to a return on their money, they drive as hard a bargain as any Western commercial banking institution.

(Continued on page 37)

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"The highly politicized conflict in Cyprus may defy solution. The prospects for a settlement are by no means hopeful. . . . In the meantime . . . electric power from the south supplies the needs of the whole island, while water from the north quenches the thirst of the land and people in the plains surrounding Nicosia."

The Problem of Cyprus

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THE CYPRUS CONFLICT has been in the headlines for the last 25 years and chances are that it will continue to be in the foreseeable future.

Cypriot society is not homogeneous and therein lies one component of the Cyprus conflict.¹ Out of a to-

tal population of approximately 650,000, some 500,000 are of Greek origin and some 115,000 are of Turkish origin.² The balance is made up of Armenian and Maronite³ Cypriots and some others, mostly retired Britons.

As it began to emerge in the 1950's, the conflict was one of colonialism versus the right of self-determination; in the 1960's, an independent Cypriot Republic, beset with a constitutional crisis and civil strife, also faced the threat of a military intervention and the "mediation efforts" of the Western powers, the ultimate aim of which was the dissolution of the Cypriot state and its annexation by Greece and Turkey;⁴ in the 1970's the events in Cyprus took such a tragic turn that the very grave possibility now exists that the young republic may become the first member of the United Nations to cease to exist, annexed wholly or in part by its "overprotective" neighbors. Ironically, these neighbors, namely Greece and Turkey, are countries that undertook solemn international obligations to protect and respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.⁵

The Cypriot struggle was among the earliest of the anticolonial movements that swept Africa and Asia in the 1950's and 1960's.⁶ However, it did not have as its final aim the achievement of Cypriot independence. Its avowed goal was *enosis*, that is, union with Greece, to be achieved through the exercise of self-determination. Great Britain, the colonial power, refused to grant the Cypriots that right because she regarded Cyprus as a base necessary for the defense of her imperial interests east of the Suez. Turkey objected to *enosis* also, contending that any changes in the status quo of Cyprus would be detrimental to her security. The Turkish foreign minister had argued that

. . . the right of Turkey to ensure her own security [requires that] in case British sovereignty comes to an end, Cyprus cannot be taken in hand as an entity separate from Anatolia.⁷

¹ The two other components, which are playing a much more decisive role in the Cyprus conflict, are the regional rivalry between Greece and Turkey and the global rivalry between East and West.

² The relationship of Cyprus with the Greek world can be traced back to the second millennium B.C. The Turkish connection began with the Ottoman conquest of 1571. In its aftermath, soldiers of Sultan Selim's army, Muslims and Christians were permanently settled on the island, reinforced from time to time by emigrants from Ottoman dominions.

³ The Maronites are Greek speaking and Christian but follow the Latin Church. All Maronite villages are currently under Turkish occupation, but, unlike the Greek villages, their population has not been forcefully expelled. The Maronite experience is sufficient to contradict the naive and erroneous thesis that the local conflict is religious rather than political. See, for example, Stephen Oren, "Religious War on Cyprus; No Alternative to Partition," *Worldview*, vol. 18, no. 5 (May, 1975).

⁴ In its essence, the United States-proposed Ball-Acheson plan of 1964 envisioned a form of double *enosis* or simply the partitioning of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. For details, see Van Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question," in Couloumbis and Hicks, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus: The Clash of Principle and Pragmatism* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1975), pp. 113-17.

⁵ These obligations to which reference will be made subsequently can be found in the Zurich-London agreements that established the independence of Cyprus. For texts see *Cyprus*, Cmnd. 1093 (London: HMSO, 1960).

⁶ For details see Harry J. Psomiades, "The Cyprus Dispute," *Current History*, May, 1965; Suat Bilge, *Le Conflict de Chypre et les Cypriotes Turcs* (Ankara: Ajans-Turk Mathaasi, 1961); and the two volumes by S. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation 1954-58* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic* (The Hague: Monton, 1973).

⁷ See his statement in *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus*, Cmnd. 9594 (London: HMSO, 1955), p. 13.

In a last ditch attempt to retain Cyprus and counter the Cypriot underground of EOKA,⁸ the British government suggested in 1956 that because of the presence of the Turkish Cypriot minority on Cyprus, partition might be a solution.

With that threat shadowing Cyprus and in the light of Greece's decision that her alliance interests had to prevail over her interests in Cyprus,⁹ a compromise was reached terminating the guerrilla campaign for enosis.

The Zurich-London agreements establishing an independent Cyprus were worked out by Greece, Turkey, and England in the absence of Cypriot representatives. On behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, Fazil Kutchuk signed readily. Archbishop Makarios had serious reservations on many of the provisions of the settlement. However, under pressure from all three powers and particularly from Greece, he too signed the agreements.¹⁰

As an independent and sovereign republic, Cyprus was to be allied to Greece and Turkey but not to NATO.¹¹ The republic undertook to respect her constitution and not to participate in whole(enosis) or in part(partition) in political or economic union with any other state. Provisions were made for the retention of two British sovereign base areas and for the limited military presence of Greece and Turkey in territory under republican sovereignty. All three powers jointly guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the state of affairs established by its constitution. Each however reserved the right to take unilateral action "... with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by

the present Treaty"¹² if joint consultations for representations and measures could not be agreed on.

In order to secure the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, who comprised 18 percent of the population, the constitution was designed to prevent majority rule. The President had to be a Greek Cypriot, elected separately by his community; the Vice President had to be a Turkish Cypriot, elected by his community. Both had veto powers over foreign affairs, defense and security. Representation in elected office and the allocation of civil service and security posts were to reflect a 70:30 ratio, the ratio was 60:40 in the army. Separate majorities were required for the passage of important legislation like taxation. Through separate Communal Chambers, complete autonomy was granted to the two communities in educational, religious, cultural and local affairs, as well as in matters of personal status and community taxation. Amendments to those articles of the constitution that were not immutable required a separate two-thirds majority.

Although beset by problems from the beginning, the constitutional machinery functioned for almost three years. By then, however, the republic was in a deadlock over critical constitutional issues that seriously impaired the functioning of the state. In an effort to eliminate these constitutional deadlocks, the President suggested to the Vice-President certain amendments to the constitution.¹³ These suggestions were rejected first by Ankara and subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots who viewed them as an attempt to take away their constitutional rights.

Unfortunately for the vast majority of the Cypriots, extremists provoked communal fighting that spread rapidly. The Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government in protest and barricaded themselves in their neighborhoods.¹⁴ For the second time in a decade, intercommunal fighting poisoned the traditionally amicable relations that had characterized Cypriot society for centuries.¹⁵

Local fighting during the period between 1963 and 1967 often brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. Turkey would threaten military intervention in Cyprus while Greece would make it clear that any such action would precipitate a Greco-Turkish war. Twice war was averted mainly by Western mediation, with the United States playing a prominent role.

Western and particularly United States policy toward Cyprus reflected the fear that the Cyprus conflict was jeopardizing the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was offering a golden opportunity for Soviet influence and an eventual Soviet takeover in Cyprus.¹⁶ Consequently, all Western mediation efforts were geared to keep the conflict within the NATO "family" and to obtain a solution that safeguarded NATO's interests. From past experience, the Cyprus government viewed

⁸ Acronym for *Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston* (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

⁹ Implemented by the Karamanlis government, this policy was followed by all successive governments with the exception of a brief period during Papandreou's tenure in 1964. Known as the policy of the national center, it became a constant irritant in Greco-Cypriot relations.

¹⁰ On this point see W. Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of EOKA* (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1959), p. viii; and Doros Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrillas: Grivas, Makarios and the British* (London: 1960), p. 3.

¹¹ A "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1959 between Karamanlis and Menderes which inter alia provided for Cyprus's membership in NATO never materialized because of Cyprus's decision to follow a nonaligned policy. Stephen Xydis, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*, p. 519.

¹² Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.

¹³ For the President's proposals see *Cyprus Today* (Nicosia: Greek Communal Chamber, November-December, 1963), p. 1.

¹⁴ In the aftermath of the 1963-1964 fighting, Turkish armed enclaves emerged throughout the island. Many Turkish Cypriots gathered out of genuine fear. Evidence, however, also suggested a self-isolation policy imposed by the Turkish leadership on its own community.

¹⁵ During the EOKA campaign, Britain employed Turkish Cypriots as auxiliary police and this inevitably led to reprisals by EOKA leading to a vicious circle of violence.

¹⁶ The presence of a strong local communal party and its successes in the polls completed the picture of Soviet "intervention."

such a policy as inimical to its own interests. Consequently, despite the pressures brought against it, the Cyprus government insisted and obtained United Nations involvement. A peace-keeping force (UNFICYP), authorized by the Security Council and with the consent of the Cyprus government, was deployed in Cyprus and U.N. mediation was provided.

Unfortunately, the initial U.N. mediation was overshadowed by the "unofficial" mediation of United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, ostensibly assigned by United States President Lyndon B. Johnson to assist the U.N. mediator. Acheson's plan, which in its essence envisioned the dissolution of the Cypriot state, was skillfully sabotaged by President Makarios much to the frustration of Dean Acheson. A second U.N. mediator proposed¹⁷ that a solution should be found on the basis of an independent and demilitarized Cyprus, with adequate international guarantees for all its citizens. A federal solution based on the geographical separation of the two communities was rejected on the grounds that it would have involved the compulsory movement of people and might facilitate the partitioning of the country. Although Greece and Cyprus responded favorably to the proposals, Turkey summarily rejected them and the mediation collapsed.

Hopes for a peaceful, negotiated solution were temporarily raised in 1968 when, under the auspices of the U.N., intercommunal talks began between Glafcos Klerides and Rauf Denktash, representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively. At the same time, however, the Greek regime of George Papadopoulos, which had seized power in the 1967 coup, had initiated a policy of rapprochement with Turkey. The problem of Cyprus, the barometer of Greco-Turkish relations, had to be solved. An initiative by Papadopoulos had failed,¹⁸ but the principle of the suggestion, namely, that the problem must be solved on the basis of bilateral negotiations with Turkey, became the policy of the Greek regime. It had long been the policy of the Turkish government.

Under such circumstances, the intercommunal

talks were only of secondary importance. For although intercommunal talks were officially endorsed by Athens, Ankara, and the Western powers as the forum through which Cypriots were allowed to solve their problems, Athens and Ankara were determined to have the final word. The talks would only have provided the forum through which "legitimacy" would have been given to a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey. In this way, the accusation that a solution was once again being imposed on the Cypriots would have had no basis.

Secret Greco-Turkish negotiations were intensified in 1971.¹⁹ At the same time, the intercommunal talks, which were in one of their frequent deadlocks, were expanded to include constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey. This development came as a result of an agreement between the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey who were attending the General Assembly meetings at the United Nations. The development also undercut efforts by the Secretary General for a new initiative on Cyprus.²⁰

Throughout the conflict, Turkey had followed a consistent Cyprus policy, favoring either outright partition or some form of cantonal or federal solution based on a geographic separation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was a policy faithfully supported by the Turkish Cypriots who, because of their small numbers, were utterly dependent on support from Ankara. This was not the case in the relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots who had demonstrated convincingly in the past that no agreement would be imposed on them except by force.

Greco-Cypriot relations were further complicated because of the ambivalent and inconsistent Cyprus policy that characterized most of Papadopoulos' tenure and that ultimately set the stage for the events of 1974. Officially, the Greek regime purported to respect the independence of Cyprus and the intercommunal talks as the only forum through which a peaceful solution could really be reached. At the same time it carried on secret negotiations with Turkey. In both cases, enosis could not have formed the basis for any meaningful negotiations. Yet unofficially the Athens regime was using the Greek contingent and the Greek-officered Cypriot National Guard to undermine the authority and effectiveness of the Cypriot government.

Greek-sponsored subversion was intensified with the clandestine arrival of General George Grivas, the legendary EOKA leader and an ardent opponent of Makarios's independent policy. His arrival was not possible without the passive tolerance of Athens, although Grivas was by no means Athens's man.

Grivas soon organized EOKA-B, a carbon copy of his anticolonial movement, only this time his target was the Cyprus government and specifically his

¹⁷ See Report by the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General, March 26, 1965. U.N. Doc. S/6253 (1953).

¹⁸ The Kesan-Alexandroupolis conference of September, 1967, between Papadopoulos and Demirel. Greece sought a solution on the basis of enosis with concessions, but Turkey rejected it.

¹⁹ That such negotiations were going on, we have on the authority of former Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim. See his "Reminiscences on Cyprus," *Dis Politika-Foreign Policy*, vol. 4, no. 23, pp. 161-2.

²⁰ U Thant's initiative involved mediation by a committee comprised of members of the Security Council under the presidency of a country friendly to all parties. The committee would have had an open mandate and would have been accountable to the council.

former comrade, the Archbishop.²¹ A fratricidal conflict began to develop within the Greek Cypriot community. Athens refused to condemn the EOKA-B violence; instead it actively supported it through the words and deeds of its ambassador to Cyprus.²²

The overthrow of Papadopoulos in late 1973 and the death of Grivas in early 1974 began a chain of events that ultimately brought about the July 15, 1974, coup. The death of Grivas left a dynamic

²¹ Possessing an independent and volatile personality, Grivas claimed to have his own plans to bring about enosis. He often spoke contemptuously of Athens, warning his followers to be careful in their dealings with Greek officials. To the extent that he and Athens wanted Makarios removed, however, they had a "common goal."

²² In 1972, a plan, *Sphendone*, called for the "intervention" of the Greek-officered National Guard to pacify violence between government supporters and Grivas partisans. Both Grivas and Makarios would have been removed, being considered responsible for the civil strife. The action was planned to "coincide" with Greek demands on Makarios. See text.

²³ In his statement before the United States House Select Committee on Intelligence, the former ambassador to Cyprus stated that in a May-June, 1974, visit to Cyprus the government informed him in "very strong terms" of documentary evidence linking the CIA to the finances of EOKA-B through Ioannides. The "bag man" was an old CIA hand familiar with Cyprus. See transcripts of hearings, "1974 Cyprus Coup and Invasion," House Select Committee on Intelligence, session of September 30, 1975, pp. 2165 and 2169 (note: the full hearings will be published in January, 1976). For more on the CIA involvement, see Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy*, no. 19 (Summer, 1975), pp. 47-48.

²⁴ Apart from the Greco-Cypriot conflict, Greco-Turkish conflict in the summer of 1974 over the Aegean may yet explain the July events in Cyprus. It appears that the Ioannides regime was under tremendous pressure to give in to Turkish demands over the Aegean and Cyprus. He claims that Turkey was all but blackmailing Greece during that period, and Ambassador Tasca says that it is his judgment that the Turks were preparing an invasion before the coup and would have taken advantage of the deteriorating situation of the Greek regime to launch it. See transcripts of hearings, "1974 Coup and Invasion," *ibid.*, session of October 1, 1975, pp. 2281-82.

²⁵ Dionysios Kardianos, in *Estia* (Athens Daily), March 7, 1975.

²⁶ Stern, *ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁷ We have it on the authority of former CIA director Allen Dulles that the FBIS stations in Cyprus and elsewhere are CIA operations. See his comments in the meeting of the Warren Commission of December 6, 1963, in *Record Group 272, Record of the President's Commission on the Assassination of Kennedy* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives).

²⁸ Among the successes of the CIA during the Cyprus crisis was "the acquisition of a series of unique reports concerning the plan of Greek strongman Ioannides to move forcefully against the Cyprus problems." See transcripts of hearings, "Cyprus Coup and Invasion," *ibid.*, session of October 1, 1975, pp. 2247.

²⁹ The CIA did the discouraging since Tasca had refused to deliver the message to a "cop" (Ioannides's official status was head of the military police). The CIA's evaluation is entitled, "Post Mortem Report and Examination of the Intelligence Community; Performance Before and During the Cyprus Crisis of 1974." It is a lengthy and classified document. A sanitized version was presented to the committee.

vacuum in leadership in EOKA-B. Greek officers loyal to Dimitrios Ioannides, particularly the chief of staff of the Greek contingent, Colonel Papadakis, with the support of Grivas's extremist lieutenants, neutralized Grivas's heir apparent, Major Karousos. Taking advantage of a government amnesty, Karousos attempted to politicize the EOKA-B struggle. His removal to Athens became a *sine qua non* for continued support of EOKA-B by the Ioannides regime. When it occurred in February, 1974, money began flowing in. A partial source of EOKA-B money was shipowner Potamianos, who operated under the pseudonym "Navaronos." Most of the money, however, over one million Cypriot pounds in 1974, came from a non-Greek source in Athens.²³

The Ioannides regime took an upcompromising attitude toward Makarios and toward the increasingly vocal Turkish claims in the Aegean.²⁴ In order to deal effectively with Cyprus, Ioannides organized the "Cyprus Bureau" in total secrecy at the Greek Pentagon.²⁵ He was aided by officers who had served in Cyprus. EOKA-B was being prepared to play the secondary role in a coup d'état to be launched by the Greek contingent and the National Guard.

Cypriot intelligence picked up indisputable evidence of the planned coup, and on the basis of this evidence the government began taking measures to neutralize the influence of EOKA-B and the Greek officers.

Diplomatically, the Makarios government began "leaking" information on Greek intentions as early as February, 1974, in an effort to preempt Greek moves through diplomatic pressure on the Greek regime. Such a plan had been successful in the past. Well aware of United States influence with the Greek regime, the United States government was officially and unofficially informed.²⁶ The United States could verify the information independently through its own sources in the area and through the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) monitoring stations in Cyprus.²⁷

In an apparent effort to obtain the United States view of the matter, around June 20, Ioannides himself had informed Stacy B. Bulse, Jr., the CIA station's chief in Athens, of his plans²⁸ to overthrow Makarios. According to the CIA's own evaluation of its performance during the crisis, Ioannides was discouraged through the Athens embassy from taking any action.²⁹ In an early July report from a

(Continued on page 38)

Marios L. Evriviades is the author of "The Legal Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict," *Texas International Law Journal*, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring, 1975). *External Pressures and Internal Subversion: The Case of Cyprus, 1967-1972*, is the title of his doctoral thesis.

"In 1975, the OPEC members and the oil-consuming nations gained a further understanding of the sensitivities, strengths and weaknesses of their partners and their adversaries in the future world oil dialogue."

Middle East Oil and the OPEC Nations

BY RALPH MAGNUS

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THE PAST YEAR was a curious one for the major oil-producing states of the Middle East and for the major oil-consuming states of the industrialized world as well. There were internal stresses and strains within the respective organizations of producers and consumers—the 13-member bloc of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the newly established 18-member International Energy Agency (IEA). As a result, there was much hesitation and floundering over the projected producer-consumer conference, which was supposed to have been the central item on the world energy agenda at the beginning of the year.

In 1973–1974, confusion in the world energy situation rose from the combined effects of the use of the "oil weapon" by the Arab states in their struggle against Israel and the spectacular price rises dictated by OPEC at the same time. Some analysts, one of the most prominent being United States Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, believed that the inexorable forces of the marketplace would either force a break in the "artificially high" level of OPEC prices or, hopefully, would lead to the break-up of OPEC itself. Others, led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, thought that the existence of shared political goals (especially among the Arab producers) and the obvious economic benefits accruing to all the OPEC members would serve to hold the organization together, at least for some length of time. On the other hand, the shared danger from the political-economic effects of the Arab embargo and OPEC's price rise would force the major consuming nations into effective cooperation in order to meet the challenge presented by the unity of the producers.

Just what would result from this projected unity of both producers and consumers was, however, the subject of continued and heated debate. Some argued, both inside and outside official circles, that

the overwhelming political-economic and military superiority of the Western consumers could be used to overcome OPEC's unity and to force concessions from the producers. This could be accomplished either brutally through the application of naked politico-economic pressure, with military pressure as an ultimate last resort or, alternatively and more subtly, through a combination of the economic resources of the developed world and the moral suasion of the hard-hit "fourth world" of the oil-poor, underdeveloped nations.

Still another school of thought held that the major producing and consuming states had a greater interest in cooperation (given the consumers' need for oil and the producers' need for markets for their oil and the aid of the industrialized nations in their ambitious programs of economic, political and social development) than they had in mutually self-destructive confrontation. Thus, a genuine dialogue could result in a truly satisfactory compromise in the differences between them and a recognition of their fundamental community of interests.

At the opposite extreme, there were those who believed that the economic power of the oil producers would lead to their economic and political domination of the world, because they would manipulate their huge financial surpluses to undermine and eventually to gain control over the economies of the industrialized countries.

In the end, 1975 was a curious year, largely because none of the popular or expert theories proved to be of much value. In the sense of charting a new course for the Middle East oil states as a whole, nothing really significant happened. In a larger sense, as Sherlock Holmes noted in *The Adventure of the Silver Blaze*, perhaps the most significant fact was precisely the fact that nothing significant had happened.

The year 1975 offered the first real test of con-

**Table 1: Middle East Crude Oil Production
(Thousand Barrels Daily)**

| | 1973 | 1974 | 1st Half 1975 | % Change '74-'75 |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|------------------|---------------------|
| Saudi Arabia (Aramco) | 7,345 | 8,213 | 6,575 | -19 |
| Iran | 5,861 | 6,056 | 5,432 | -12 |
| Kuwait (KOC) | 2,753 | 2,276 | 1,890 | -27 |
| Iraq | 1,930 | 1,892 | 2,114 | +14 |
| Abu Dhabi | 1,301 | 1,417 | 1,200 | -19 |
| Neutral Zone | 527 | 543 | 503 | -8 |
| Qatar | 570 | 519 | 460 | -12 |
| Oman | 293 | 290 | 314 | +5 |
| Dubai | 220 | 241 | 251 | +8 |
| Bahrain | 68 | 67 | 63 | -8 |
| Sharjah | — | 23 | 40 | |
| Totals* | 20,868 | 21,537 | 18,842 | -14 |
| North Africa | | | | |
| Libya | 2,169 | 1,560 | 1,120 | -41 |
| Algeria | 1,100 | 1,037 | 851** | -22 |

* Not included are Syria, Israel and Israeli-occupied Egypt, and Turkey. Of these minor producers only Syria is also an exporter and her 1974 production averaged approximately 125,000 barrels per day.

** Estimated.

Source: *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 18, nos. 18 & 46 (February 21, and September 5, 1975); and *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, vol. 14, no. 30 (July 28, 1975).

sumer response to the OPEC price increases of 1973-1974. The final production figures for 1974 had been distorted by the abnormal effects of the Arab oil embargo and its aftermath. For the Middle East as a whole, exclusive of North Africa, production was up by 3.4 percent in 1974 as compared to the previous year.¹ For the first half of 1975, however, Middle East oil production averaged only 18.8 million barrels per day, a decline of 2 million barrels per day compared with 1973 and 3 million barrels per day below production in 1974.² This 14-percent decline was the clearest indication of the operation of market forces and imposed severe strains on the solidarity of OPEC.

Despite this decline in volume and an even more serious decline in the real value of OPEC's income due to currency depreciation and the effects of worldwide inflation, the accumulation of monetary surpluses in the hands of OPEC members in 1975 was still estimated by the United States Treasury to be \$45.7 billion from an oil income of \$98.1 billion,³ compared to a 1973 surplus of \$4.9 billion from an oil revenue of \$25.2 billion. Why, then, did OPEC members want to raise their prices even further?

The answer lay in the asymmetry of the oil resources and the economies of the member states of OPEC. Although it is sometimes necessary to think in terms of OPEC as a whole, in fact OPEC produces no oil and receives no payments for oil. These profitable and delightful activities are the function of the individual sovereign member states. Those countries with the largest populations, resources and potential for development, like Iran, wish to have the highest possible incomes in the shortest possible time span. They want to buy the industrial goods needed for their development plans, including their military development plans before the prices rise further. The Shah of Iran has repeatedly talked of an inflation rate of 35 percent in the price of Iranian imports, while economists in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have calculated that a weighted average of OECD exports to OPEC countries rose by 22.5 percent between the first quarters of 1974 and 1975.⁴

In order to maintain OPEC's high price level, production must be reduced somewhere. Logically, if OPEC were a perfect cartel, it would reduce production for each state by a required percentage to meet the demand for OPEC oil at a given price, either across the board or through some formula to take into account the varying resources and economic needs of each member. This is an option that OPEC has repeatedly discussed but repeatedly failed to agree on. No member state wishes to give up its hard-won ability to set its own production goals, after suffering the dictates of the international oil companies for the past 50 years.

A DISAGREEMENT

This lack of agreement has thrown the burden of the market-induced production cutbacks largely on the truly rich oil states, principally on Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a production capacity of 12 million barrels per day, but was producing at a rate of only 6.6 million barrels per day in the first half of 1975. Even at this reduced rate, the Saudis were estimated to be adding to their monetary surplus at the rate of over \$20 billion a year.⁵ With equal economic justification, the Saudis could support either a production decrease or a price decrease. Thus far, they have responded to the pleas of their fellow OPEC members and have absorbed the market-induced production cutbacks in order to maintain the level of OPEC's prices. However, they have become increasingly restless over this situation. Even the 10 percent OPEC price increase in September, 1975, represented an actual decline in the price of OPEC oil from the rates established at the beginning of 1974 because of inflation and currency depreciation. The split between the Saudis and the other OPEC members led by Iran was increasingly obvious

¹ *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 18, no. 18 (February 21, 1975), p. v. Libya's production was down 28.1 percent and Algeria's, 5.7 percent in 1974.

² See Table 1.

³ See Table 2.

⁴ "Two Years of OPEC," *The Economist* (London), September 30, 1975, p. 84.

⁵ See Table 2.

Table 2: OPEC Investable Surplus*
(billions of dollars)

| | 1973 | | | 1974 | | | 1975 | | |
|----------------------|-------------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|---------|
| | Oil Revenue | Imports | Surplus | Oil Revenue | Imports | Surplus | Oil Revenue | Imports | Surplus |
| Algeria | 1.0 | -2.1 | -0.9 | 3.7 | -3.7 | 0.4 | 3.6 | -5.7 | -2.0 |
| Ecuador | 0.1 | -0.5 | -0.1 | 0.5 | -0.8 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.9 | -0.1 |
| Indonesia | 1.2 | -2.4 | -0.4 | 3.4 | -3.9 | 0.2 | 3.7 | -4.7 | -0.3 |
| Iran | 4.5 | -3.6 | 1.1 | 18.7 | -8.0 | 10.7 | 19.9 | -10.6 | 9.6 |
| Iraq | 1.7 | -1.2 | 0.5 | 5.7 | -3.5 | 2.0 | 7.6 | -6.6 | 0.5 |
| Kuwait | 1.9 | -0.9 | 1.5 | 8.0 | -1.5 | 7.3 | 7.9 | -2.1 | 7.1 |
| Libya | 2.3 | -2.2 | -0.6 | 6.2 | -3.0 | 2.5 | 5.2 | -4.1 | 0.7 |
| Nigeria | 2.4 | -1.8 | 0.3 | 7.6 | -2.5 | 5.2 | 6.7 | -5.1 | 1.9 |
| Qatar | 0.4 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 1.6 | -0.3 | 1.3 | 1.8 | -0.4 | 1.3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 5.5 | -1.8 | 3.1 | 24.6 | -3.5 | 20.8 | 26.7 | -5.7 | 20.1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1.2 | -0.9 | 0.3 | 6.0 | -1.6 | 4.4 | 6.5 | -2.2 | 4.2 |
| Venezuela | 3.0 | -2.8 | -0.1 | 8.9 | -4.7 | 4.0 | 8.3 | -6.5 | 1.8 |
| Totals | 25.2 | -20.3 | 4.9 | 94.9 | -36.9 | 58.9 | 98.3 | -54.6 | 49.6 |

* Imports are FOB; surplus is plus non-oil exports and plus or minus service payments and private transfers.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, *The Absorptive Capacity of the OPEC Countries, Annex*, September 5, 1976.

Note: figures estimated for 1975 do not take into account the 10 percent price increase announced by OPEC effective October 1.

throughout 1975 and exploded into acrimonious public debate (something very rare within OPEC) over the 10 percent price increase finally set at Vienna in September.⁶

If anything, Saudi Arabia's economic position within OPEC is likely to improve even more. At 12 million barrels per day, the Saudis now have approximately one-third of OPEC's productive capacity. They are currently working with their Aramco partners to increase this by 25 percent to nearly 16 million barrels per day.⁷

PRICE SHAVING AND DIFFERENTIALS

Even with Saudi Arabia's absorption of most of the drop in production, serious economic strains have weakened OPEC solidarity. Although the price of

Saudi Arabian light crude functions as a bench mark for other OPEC prices, in fact each member sets the actual price for each of its crudes based on a variety of differentials for such factors as specific gravity, sulphur content and transportation costs. OPEC monitors the price of 42 separate crudes at its Vienna headquarters.⁸ In addition, each country offers its own credit arrangements to its purchasers. The purchasers have thus sought out those crudes with the lowest possible prices. Each producer, in order to maximize its income, faces the temptation of price shaving on its differentials or offering credit terms to make its crude more attractive to purchasers. The consequent shifts can be devastating to a particular country. For example, in early 1975 Abu Dhabi found its production running at only half of what it had projected as buyers moved away from its high-priced but low-sulphur crudes. It recaptured this market by lowering its differentials, a move which was approved ex post facto by OPEC.⁹ Naturally, countries hit with a sharp decline in their incomes are not pleased when other OPEC members are getting a larger share of the market by secretly cutting their prices. Countering the general decline in Middle East production, Iraqi production increased 42 percent in the month of May, because Iraqi oil was selling for only \$10.45 a barrel at Mediterranean terminals.¹⁰

OPEC's economic experts have warned that a lack of agreement on price differentials is likely to produce further price cutting among the members "and undoubtedly constitutes a real threat to the OPEC price structure and the organization as a whole."¹¹ In October, Kuwait invited the Gulf producers to meet to decide on a uniform system of differentials at least

⁶ "Brother OPEC," *The Economist* (London), October 4, 1975, pp. 69-70. An example of the bitterness of the debate within OPEC was provided by Iranian Minister of Finance and chief OPEC delegate Jamshid Amuzegar's comment on a Tehran television interview that Saudi Arabia and another OPEC Muslim member had entered into an "unholy alliance in this holy month of Ramadhan" to try to limit the proposed increase to five percent. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Middle East and North Africa*, vol. 5, no. 192 (October 2, 1975), p. R2.

⁷ "Lucky—well, luckyish—this time," *The Economist* (London), August 30, 1975, p. 61.

⁸ *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, vol. 14, no. 39 (September 29, 1975), p. 4.

⁹ *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 18, no. 19 (February 28, 1975), pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ James C. Tanner, "Coming Oil Price Rise Is Likely to be Small; Goal Is Saving OPEC," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 1975, p. 23.

¹¹ *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, vol. 14, no. 27 (July 7, 1975), p. 1.

for the Gulf area, but Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi declined to attend.¹²

Despite economic conflicts in the OPEC structure, thus far the shared economic goal has provided the most powerful cement for the organization. Estimated oil revenues for 1975 are \$98 billion (before the 10 percent price increase effective October 1), contrasted with the \$25 billion received by OPEC members in 1973.¹³ Thus, even the most "radical"—radical in their internal political orientations and in their oil policies—members, like Algeria and Iraq, joined with the moderate Kuwaiti delegation to compromise the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the OPEC conference in Vienna in September, 1975. Market forces were at work and did produce strains for OPEC, but it would seem to be a very long run indeed before they might cause the disintegration of OPEC.

POLITICAL STRESS AND SOLIDARITY

It was clear that the most serious intra-OPEC conflict, involving Iran and Saudi Arabia, contained a political element as well as a difference in economic approaches. Although the relations between the two neighbors are officially described as "brotherly," the rivalry between them for the leading position in the Gulf area is not likely to be resolved for some time. The more Saudi Arabia assumes a leading and active role in the Arab world, the greater will be the potential for conflicts brought about by Iran's assumption that the other Gulf states (all of them Arab) will automatically follow the Iranian lead in regional issues.

Potential conflicts, however, must be balanced against some excellent examples of OPEC's political solidarity during 1975. The most important of these was the reconciliation between Iran and Iraq. This ancient conflict, which had escalated to the brink of open war with Iranian support for the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, was put on the road to an eventual settlement with the mediation of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne to the applause of the leaders of the OPEC states at the Algiers summit conference in March, 1975.

The "Solemn Declaration" issued by the Algiers

summit demonstrated the fundamental political unity of OPEC in its preparations for the producer-consumer dialogue.¹⁴ The declaration reaffirmed

the solidarity which unites their countries in safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of their peoples, reasserting the sovereign and inalienable right of their countries to the ownership, exploitation and pricing of their natural resources and rejecting any idea or attempt that challenges those fundamental rights and, thereby, the sovereignty of their countries.

In his opening address, President Boumedienne declared that the OPEC aim was cooperation and not confrontation with the industrialized consuming nations.

If prices have to be frozen, we will freeze them; if they must be decreased, we will decrease them, provided, however, that the developed countries make a similar and simultaneous effort in return—with each contributing according to his means and responsibilities to the reorganization of the world economy and the establishment of the stability required for development and prosperity.¹⁵

In a large sense, the fact that for the first time the OPEC leaders held a summit conference instead of the usual meetings of oil and finance ministers was a clear indication of the political importance that they attached to their organization and to the projected producer-consumer meeting.

PRODUCER-CONSUMER RELATIONS

The prospect of a dialogue with the consuming states or the possibility of more serious conflict with them served to support the unity of the producer states. In January, in an interview in *Business Week*, Secretary Kissinger declared that the actual "strangulation" of the industrialized nations would be a justification for the use of military force against the producing nations.¹⁶ This comment aroused a storm of indignation in the Middle East, but Kissinger pointed out that the interview as a whole had been conciliatory in tone, warning against the counterproductive effects of strong political and economic pressures on the producing states.

Speculation about possible military moves, fueled by the statements of American officials and by sensational articles in popular journals based on scenarios for a United States takeover of the Saudi oilfields, caused Secretary Kissinger to give specific public assurances to King Faisal.

I would like to state categorically here [he announced at Riyadh on March 19] that our relations with Saudi Arabia are based on friendship and cooperation in which threats—military or otherwise—play no part. They are based on cooperation, not on confrontation.¹⁷

This statement did not rule out some very hard bargaining at the Paris preparatory meeting in April to set the agenda for the coming producer-consumer dialogue. On the eve of the conference, one of the

¹² *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, vol. 14, no. 43 (October, 27, 1975), p. 1.

¹³ See Table 2.

¹⁴ The text of the declaration may be found as a supplement to *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 18, no. 20 (March 7, 1975), pp. i-vii.

¹⁵ Quoted in Ian Seymour, "OPEC Summit Declaration Calls for New Deal between Industrialized Nations and Third World," *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁶ "Secretary Kissinger's Interview for *Business Week Magazine*," *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 72, no. 1875 (January 27, 1975), p. 101.

¹⁷ *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. 18, no. 22 (March 21, 1975), p. 1.

principal United States negotiators, Thomas Enders, told a British television audience that the goal of the United States was to "hasten OPEC's demise."¹⁸ The preliminary meeting was unable to reach agreement on the agenda for the full conference and adjourned in confusion. Under the leadership of the United States, the representatives of the Common Market and Japan maintained that the conference was to focus on energy issues, with the discussion of matters like trade, development, and monetary reform to be in a decidedly secondary position.

It soon became apparent, however, that Saudi Arabia was fully backing the OPEC position that these "peripheral" matters be given equal weight. In an interview in *The Washington Star*, Sheik Yamani asserted that his country's attitude on oil depended on progress toward a producer-consumer conference.

... if we feel that a confrontation has developed [he said] then our role as a moderate member, a moderate element inside OPEC might cease to exist. They should not expect Saudi Arabia to abandon its responsibilities as a member of OPEC or to work against OPEC. We have unity there. We won't continue to call for moderation if there is a confrontation.¹⁹

A little more than a month after Yamani's warning, the United States offered a new compromise plan to resume the broken dialogue. The plan was outlined in speeches by Secretary Kissinger at meetings of the IEA and OECD in Paris in late May;²⁰ the plan, to have separate commissions to discuss the various issues, with progress in each area not being contingent on equal progress in all areas, was accepted by OPEC. A second preparatory conference in October made the plan the basis for the agenda of the full producer-consumer conference scheduled to meet in Paris on December 16 and 17.

THE GREAT PETRODOLLAR SCARE

One issue, at least, was apparently resolved in 1975. It became clear that the possibility that an accumulation of OPEC's "petrodollars" might be used to disrupt and eventually to destroy or take over

the economies of the industrialized countries had been greatly exaggerated.

The petrodollar problem was manageable because of a combination of the innate conservatism of the investors with the largest surpluses, the drop in oil production, the rate of inflation and, above all, a remarkable demonstration of the producing countries' ability to spend. Studies by three leading American banks predicted that by 1980 the current accounts surplus of OPEC members would disappear.²¹ The United States, which had received \$11 billion in petrodollar investments in 1974, was expected to receive only an additional \$5 billion in 1975.²²

Indeed, as the Middle Eastern nations became increasingly tied to expensive Western imports in their development plans, military purchases and consumer appetites, they were forging bonds of common interest with the major oil consumers. An example of their propensity to spend was seen in the new five year development plan of Saudi Arabia, which projected expenditures of \$143.6 billion for the years 1975-1980.²³

A YEAR OF TESTING

Although the resolution of the substantive issues for both producers and consumers was postponed in 1975, the preliminary steps toward resolution were being taken, albeit in a confusing and hesitant manner. The producers felt the heat of market forces, but their effect was somewhat dissipated by the combination of recession and inflation in the industrialized world. Inflation made them anxious to maintain the purchasing power of their oil revenues, while recession made them suspect that the drop in world demand for oil was only temporary. Thus, the Saudi position, holding the OPEC price increase of October 1 to a moderate 10 percent instead of attempting to recoup all the inflation-induced losses in purchasing power of the OPEC states, signaled the producers' wish to resume negotiations with the consumers.

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¹⁸ "Oil User-Producer Stalemate: New Price War?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 17, 1975, p. 6.

¹⁹ Quoted in "Yamani in Washington," *Middle East Economic Survey, Supplement*, vol. 18, no. 27 (April 25, 1975), p. 5.

²⁰ The texts of these speeches can be found in *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 72, no. 1878 (June 23, 1975), pp. 838-844 and 849-855.

²¹ "Those Unspent Balances," *The Petroleum Economist*, vol. 42, no. 8 (August, 1975), p. 283.

²² "Petrodollar Flow to U.S. Is Off Sharply, Poses No Threat, Treasury Official Says," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1975.

²³ The new Saudi Arabian development plan is examined in detail in Donald A. Wells, *Saudi Arabian Development Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).

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"Unless the possibility of terrorist use of nuclear weapons is quickly eliminated there may be immeasurable calamity in the Middle East."

Terrorism and the Nuclear Threat in the Middle East

BY LOUIS RENÉ BERES

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ONLY A FEW years ago, accounts of mankind's high-velocity drift toward a nuclear Armageddon were confined to the risk of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, however, such accounts are essentially different. With more than 50 major terrorist¹ groups operating in the world, many in the Middle East, terrorist activity may well lead to nuclear destruction.

Who are the terrorists in the Middle East? The configuration of bonds and breaks among terrorist groups in the Middle East is sometimes difficult to untangle, nonetheless, the latest available information suggests the following: The Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasir Arafat represents the umbrella group of the Palestinian terrorist movement. The constituent groups of the PLO are represented on the Palestine National Council, with 165 members. Power becomes more concentrated at the level of the 44-member Central Committee and the 12-member Executive Committee chaired by Arafat.

Within these bodies, Al Fatah is the biggest and probably most powerful terrorist group. Black September, a name which symbolizes the wrath of Palestinian terrorists at their suppression by Jordanian King Hussein in September, 1970, is essentially a "spin off" of Al Fatah. After Al Fatah, the most important terrorist group is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP made its appearance in November, 1967 (Al Fatah came into existence as a secret movement for the liberation of Palestine some 11 years earlier), merging two

smaller groups, the Heroes of the Return and the Palestinian faction of the Movement of Arab Nationalists.

Since then, at least three splinter groups have left the Marxist-Leninist PFLP: the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Za'rur group; and the Jibril group. Today, George Habash, chief of the PFLP, appears to be in serious conflict with Arafat. Consequently, three main groups of the PLO—Al Fatah, the Syrian-backed Al Saiqa, and Naif Hawatmeh's Popular Democratic Front—are under continuing pressure to adopt a more extreme line, defined by dissident Palestinian factions of the so-called "Rejection Front" led by Habash.

Nuclear weapons may well be used by these terrorist groups, partly because of the increased availability of nuclear weapons, either by theft of assembled systems from military stockpiles or by self-development from weapon-grade plutonium pilfered from nuclear power plants. In the case of theft of an assembled weapon, determined terrorist operatives might direct their attention to any of the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons now deployed across the world by the United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union.

How difficult would it be to carry out such a feat? According to the highly regarded *Defense Monitor*, a publication of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Army Special Forces exercises have shown that nuclear weapons storage areas can be penetrated successfully without detection despite guards, fences, and sensors. Their example could obviously be followed by a daring and well-organized terrorist organization.²

As the available supply of fossil fuels continues to be depleted, states will turn to nuclear power for energy needs. Unfortunately, the by-products of fission in the nuclear plant are the basic material for a fission bomb or radiation dispersal device.³ Hence, as increasingly large amounts of plutonium-239 are produced by the nuclear power industry in the years ahead, there will be growing opportunity for terrorists to exploit the possibilities of nuclear fuel.⁴

¹ Needless to say, members of these groups prefer the term "guerrilla" or "freedom fighter" to "terrorist."

² See *The Defense Monitor*, vol. 4, no. 2 (February, 1975), p. 8. Here, the point is made that "we are more likely to become casualties from nuclear terrorist attacks than from attacks by other countries."

³ The danger of terrorist construction of pure fusion explosives is not generally believed to be significant.

⁴ While an enormous amount of plutonium is apt to be produced by the nuclear power industry in the years ahead, only some 11 to 20 pounds are needed to construct a crude explosive device. Moreover, only 3.5 ounces are needed to make a radiation dispersal device capable of killing thousands.

How difficult would it be for terrorists to secure substantial amounts of plutonium? According to Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor the safeguards are so inadequate that it is only a matter of time before terrorists are able to remove essential fissionable materials from nuclear power plants surreptitiously.⁵ Indeed, even if appropriate steps to improve nuclear safeguards are taken in this country,⁶ genuine protection of fissionable materials from terrorist groups must be global in scope.

According to nuclear physicist Ralph Lapp, a dedicated band of bomb makers—skilled scientists and technicians in possession of plutonium—might fashion “a modestly effective implosion bomb.”⁷ Alternatively, such a group might choose to use its plutonium in a technically simpler radiation dispersal device; the plutonium would be transformed into an aerosol of finely divided particles that could be distributed uniformly into the intake of a large office building’s air conditioning system. According to Willrich and Taylor, only 3.5 ounces of this extraordinarily toxic substance (its toxicity is at least 20,000 times that of cobra venom or potassium cyanide) would pose a lethal hazard to everyone in the building.⁸

UNINHIBITED TERRORISTS

Terrorist groups in the Middle East today no longer operate according to a code of honor that distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants. Engaged in what Michael Waltzer describes as “total war against nations, ethnic groups, and religions,”⁹ their seething anger is vented almost randomly. As a result, the traditional terrorist methods of political killing or assassination have given way in the Middle East to such indiscriminate forms of terrorism as the killing of Israeli athletes and schoolchildren, the massacre of Christian passengers at an Israeli airport, the commando annihilation of a small hotel in Tel Aviv, and the explosion of bombs in Jerusalem.

⁵ See Mason Willrich and Theodore Taylor, *Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974), p. 115.

⁶ Steps to correct some of the most atrocious deficiencies in the American safeguards system—e.g., storage of large amounts of plutonium in buildings secured only by conventional locks, cross-country shipment of plutonium in unguarded trucks—were taken pursuant to a report by the General Accounting Office to the Congress in November, 1973. See Comptroller General of the United States, *Improvements Needed in the Program for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, November 7, 1973).

⁷ See Ralph Lapp, “The Ultimate Blackmail,” *The New York Times Magazine*, February 4, 1973, p. 31.

⁸ Willrich and Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁹ See Michael Waltzer, “The New Terrorists,” *The New Republic*, August 30, 1975, p. 12.

¹⁰ The three main *fedayeen* groups are Al Fatah, Al Saiqa, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

The Palestinian terrorists have no inhibitions against the application of maximum force to virtually any segment of human population other than their own. They apparently perceive themselves as engaged in a “no holds barred” situation; the amount of suffering they can inflict is apparently limited only by the availability of weapons.

The word *fedayeen* means self-sacrificers.¹⁰ It is a meaning that must be taken seriously; Palestinian terrorist groups often place a higher value on the achievement of certain political and social objectives than they do their own lives. Consequently, such groups are insensitive to the kinds of threats of retaliatory destruction that lie at the heart of the principle of deterrence. Faced with a new kind of international actor for whom the “deadly logic” of deterrence is immobilized, states bent upon counter-terrorist measures are at a unique disadvantage.

This can be illustrated most dramatically by several spectacular “special operations” conducted by the PFLP and the exploits within Al Fatah of Black September. Indeed, the general experience of PFLP commandos is death, either in combat on their expeditions or by their own hand. Only 16 to 22 years old, these terrorists often intentionally detonate their explosive-crammed belts on completion of a mission.

What are the implications of this type of behavior for the threat of nuclear terrorism in the Middle East? If Palestinian terrorists were to obtain nuclear weapons and calculate the prospective costs and benefits of their use, the fear of retaliatory destruction would probably be excluded from their calculation. Orthodox threats of deterrence, therefore, would have no bearing on the terrorists’ decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons. If diplomatic or other forms of persuasion are unsuccessful, the threatened nuclear act could be prevented only by a “surgical” or pre-emptive strike.

Heightening the threat of nuclear terrorism in the Middle East is the growing cooperation among terrorist groups. Such cooperation is indicated by the weapons training of Venezuelan terrorist Illich Remirzed Sanchez in Lebanon by the PFLP; the weapons training of the Japanese Red Army movement in Lebanon; the establishment of joint training programs and arms transfers between the Turkish People’s Army and Black September; and the training of United States Weathermen, Irish Republican Army members, and representatives of Nicaragua’s *Tandamista* movement in Palestinian camps. Additional evidence of terrorist collaboration can be detected in the demand by Black September operatives in Munich for the release of German insurgents who had been involved in killings of German policemen.

Perhaps the most notorious example of cooperation involving operatives in the Middle East is the relationship between the PFLP and the Japanese Red

Army.¹¹ It was this terrorist alliance that brought on the Lydda Airport massacre at Tel Aviv in May, 1972. There, three members of the Red Army—trained in Fedayeen camps and provided with false passports by PFLP agents—killed 26 persons and wounded 80.

The recent Red Army attack on the American embassy offices in Kuala Lumpur points to a continuing link between the two groups. In the interval between the 1972 airport venture and the Kuala Lumpur attack, mixed Red Army-PFLP squads hijacked a JAL plane (in July, 1973) and attacked the Japanese embassy in Kuwait (in February, 1974). In September, 1974, a Red Army group commandeered the French embassy at The Hague and obtained the release of both PFLP and Red Army agents.

Terrorist cooperation greatly increases the opportunities for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons, especially when acquisition takes the form of the development and design of nuclear weapons from "raw" fissionable materials. Cooperation among terrorist groups is likely to facilitate the proliferation of "private" nuclear weapons throughout the world, creating a network in which such weapons can be exchanged and transmitted with impunity across national frontiers. Cooperation among terrorists is also apt to spread the benefits of training in the use of nuclear weapons, and to provide such reciprocal privileges as forged documents, which can ease the penetration of and retreat from target areas, and safe havens, which are essential for pre-attack preparations and post-attack security.

GREATER TOLERANCE OF TERRORISM

It is a curious fact of modern political life that while terrorists are engaged in "total war" with nations, religions, and ethnic groups, the prevailing global attitude is one of tolerance, even permissiveness. In the case of the Palestine Liberation Movement, unqualified applications of violence have even spawned political recognition. Most dramatically, this tolerance provides a spectacular opportunity for groups like Fatah and PFLP to increase their strength

and to step up their activities with little fear of interference. The tolerance of terrorism may pave the way for a nuclear weapons capability on the part of the terrorists.

CONCLUSION

Unless the possibility of terrorist use of nuclear weapons is quickly eliminated, there may be immeasurable calamity in the Middle East. To prevent this, governments can take decisive measures to ensure against the theft of assembled weapons from military stockpiles and fissionable materials from the nuclear energy industry. Some steps in this direction are now being taken by the United States at military and industrial levels; but worldwide efforts must be undertaken to implement such essential safeguards as heavy containers, vaults, barriers, locks, alarms, remote surveillance, and armed guards. New and more imaginative protection systems can also be explored. One promising area involves the utilization of quick-hardening plastic foam which is effectively impenetrable and can be sprayed into storage vaults in case of attack.¹²

Since the safeguarding of nuclear materials must be international, the full weight of diplomacy must be brought to bear. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force on March 5, 1970, appears the most probable source of diplomatic procedures. Regrettably, on the basis of what is known about the status of treaties in general and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular, there is little cause for optimism, because the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), associated with the NPT, represents neither an effective instrument of international enforcement nor a viable mechanism of international inspection.¹³

Even more disconcerting is the fact that all such measures suffer from a particularly glaring defect: they offer a technological response to what is manifestly a human problem. As Mason Willrich has observed, there is no reliable "technological fix" when the problem is one of "safeguarding nuclear materials in a world of malfunctioning people."¹⁴ What is needed, then, is a strategy to strengthen the fragile partnership of technological safeguards and diplomatic processes.

Diplomatic processes must block the cooperation of various terrorist groups and must reject all terrorist demands. In the absence of such international action, the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real. ■

¹¹ See Robert Fisk, "The World's Terrorists Sometimes Are United," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1975, Section 4, p. 3; Yonah Alexander, "Some Perspectives on International Terrorism," *International Problems*, vol. 14, no. 3-4 (Fall, 1975), p. 27; and John B. Wolf, "Black September: Militant Palestinianism," *Current History*, vol. 64, no. 377, (January, 1973), p. 37.

¹² Research on this strategy is now under way at Sandia laboratories near Albuquerque. See David F. Salisbury, "How Modern Science Prevents Nuclear Theft," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1975, p. 6.

¹³ On this point, see Mason Willrich, "Perspective on the NPT Review Conference," Occasional Paper, no. 7, The Stanley Foundation, 1975.

¹⁴ See Mason Willrich, "Terrorists Keep Out: The Problem of Safeguarding Nuclear Materials in a World of Malfunctioning People," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 31, no. 5, (May, 1975), p. 12.

Louis René Beres is the author of *Planning Alternative World Futures* (New York: Praeger, 1975), *Transforming World Politics* (Denver: University of Denver, 1975) and *Reordering the Planet* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

DECISIONS IN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY.

By MICHAEL BRECHER. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. 639 pages, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

Using an elaborate theoretical framework for studying the making of foreign policy, the author examines in detail the domestic and external considerations that went into seven key decisions during Israel's first 25 years as a state.

A richness of detail and insight, a thoroughness of investigation, and a soundness of judgments make this a valuable study:

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

THE ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD. PUBLISHED BY THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975. 362 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

This important reference work on arms transfers and build-ups deals with the arms trade among 11 major industrialized nations and almost 50 third world countries. The compilation and analysis of the difficult-to-obtain data are a valuable service to those interested in world politics and the dynamics of arms races. It is the best work on the subject to date.

A.Z.R.

ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS. BY MASON WILLRICH. (New York: The Free Press, 1975. 234 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Ever since October, 1973, the energy problem has become an integral part of political discourse and international politics. In a series of six chapters, the author provides a welcome introduction to the intricacies of the overall problem. He examines the nature of interdependence; the availability of resources; the impact on the world's economy; and the political and diplomatic dimensions.

A.Z.R.

THE ELUSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

EDITED BY MALCOLM H. KERR. (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1975. 347 pages, \$14.95, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

The six papers in this volume touch on a variety of issues: the role of the United Nations in trying to find a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict; Arab and Israeli efforts at initiating a dialogue; American policy; and prospects for the future.

A.Z.R.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. EDITED BY JOHN NORTON MOORE. 3 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Vol. I, 1,067 pages; Vol. II, 1,193 pages; Vol. III, 1,248 pages, bibliography and index, \$95.00, hardback; \$12.95, paperback.)

These three volumes, sponsored by the American Society of International Law, bring together everything anyone might want to know about the origins and dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A.Z.R.

IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1941-1973: A STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY IN MODERNIZING NATIONS. BY ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI. (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1975. 507 pages, appendix, bibliography, index, \$20.00.)

The rise of Iran in world politics and the strategic importance of the oil-rich Persian Gulf lend special significance to this comprehensive, well-researched, and clearly written major work on Iran's foreign policy.

A.Z.R.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF IRAN: A DEVELOPING STATE IN A ZONE OF GREAT-POWER CONFLICT. BY SHAHRAM CHUBIN AND SEPEHR ZABIH. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 362 pages, bibliography and index, \$17.50.)

The oil of the Middle East has had far-reaching effects on regional and international politics. Iran has emerged as a major force in the area, and the Shah's policies have global implications. This valuable study traces the evolution of Iran's struggle for national assertiveness and her emergence as a key actor in the Persian Gulf.

A.Z.R.

POLITICAL ELITES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY FRANK TACHAU. (New York: Halsted Press, 1975. 310 pages, index, \$17.50 cloth; \$6.95 paperback.)

These essays treat the "interaction of political elites with forces of social, economic, political, and cultural change." Seven countries are examined: Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Iran, and Turkey.

A.Z.R.

THE CANAL WAR: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East. BY LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1974. 520 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$17.50.)

This able study examines the political and military interactions of the key actors in the Arab-

Israeli dispute: Egypt, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It focuses on the period from the June 1967 War through the October 1973 War, and, in particular, on the action-reaction behavior of the superpowers. A.Z.R.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF ISRAEL. By NOAH LUCAS. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. 500 pages, bibliography and index, \$20.00.)

This comprehensive history of modern Israel examines the historical antecedents of the Zionist movement that helped to bring about the rebirth of the Jewish state. Close attention is given to the economic institutions of the Histadrut and the emergence of the Haganah, the predecessor of the Israeli army. The impact of socialist ideas, of modern nationalism, and the troubled relationship between the Israelis and Arabs is described with commendable clarity and objectivity. A.Z.R.

EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE. By AMOS PERLMUTTER. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974. 234 pages, index, \$9.95.)

When Nasser's Egypt is coming under growing criticism from the present Egyptian leadership, this critical assessment of the political and social policies introduced by Nasser is particularly welcome. A.Z.R.

THE FORGOTTEN FRIENDSHIP: ISRAEL AND THE SOVIET BLOC. 1947-53. By ARNOLD KRAMMER. (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1974. 224 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

In the absorption with the current pro-Arab partisan role played by the Soviet Union, there is a tendency to forget that the state of Israel would probably not have survived the first two years of its existence, without the military assistance provided by Czechoslovakia and Stalin's U.S.S.R. This dramatic episode is presented with commendable objective clarity by Professor Krammer. A.Z.R.

CRISIS ON CYPRUS. A Report Prepared for the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees for the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. (Washington, D.C.: The American Hellenic Institute, Inc., 1975. 184 pages, maps and appendices, \$4.00, paper.)

ANGLO-IRANIAN RELATIONS. 1905-1919. By ISHTIAQ AHMAD. (New York: Asia Publishing House, Inc., 1975. 389 pages, appendix and index, \$15.00.)

AMERICA AND THE ARAB STATES: AN UNEASY ENCOUNTER. By ROBERT W. STOOKEY. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Publishers, 1975. 298 pages, biographical essay and index, \$6.95, paper.)

ARAB STATES OF THE LOWER GULF: PEOPLE, POLITICS, PETROLEUM. By JOHN DUKE ANTHONY. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1975. 273 pages, bibliography, glossary and index, \$10.95.)

THROUGH MIDDLE EASTERN EYES. EDITED BY ROBERT P. PEARSON. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. 245 pages, maps and photographs, \$8.50.)

MISCELLANY

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM. AMERICAN LIBERTIES: 1920-1970's. EDITED BY ALAN REITMAN. FOREWORD BY RAMSEY CLARK. (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1975. 352 pages and index, \$12.50.)

This decade by decade (1920 to 1970) scholarly study of the attacks on the violations of constitutional rights documents a depressing record of infringement and denial of these basic freedoms. A recurring theme of these five separate essays by eminent scholars on civil liberties testifies to the continuing conflict between government powers and individual rights in each of the decades studied, i.e., "the frenzied Palmer raids and mass deportations of aliens in the twenties; the use of congressional investigation as a political weapon in the thirties; the dragnet loyalty-security probes in the forties and fifties; and the usurpation of power in the sixties in order to wage undeclared war in Vietnam."

In his concluding essay, Alan Reitman, associate executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, offers an overall evaluation of the civil rights story of these five decades in which he observes that there was also a positive aspect to the power of our "large, centralized government" when it acted to extend and protect civil rights.

This book is interesting and valuable for its detailed study of the men, the ideas, the events and the institutions (especially the ACLU), that contributed to the sometimes forward, sometimes backward strides in the fight for personal freedom. The history of civil rights since World War I is intertwined with our national crises, real or imaginary, when the American public again and again demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice freedom for national security. Reitman cautions that a real improvement in society's attitudes toward our constitutional liberties must come by educating our youth to appreciate and understand the significance of the Bill of Rights. J.B.A.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Sinai Agreement, 1975

On September 1, 1975, Egypt and Israel initialed an interim agreement toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The United States Congress approved the stationing of American civilians in the Sinai on October 9; the next day, Israel ratified the agreement, which had already been ratified by Egypt. The texts of the Sinai agreement, the annex to the agreement, and the United States proposal for an early warning system in the Sinai follow in full:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea, and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the line designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to

perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.


ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.



ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1: 100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.

(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.

(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to

(Continued on page 42)

The U.N. Resolution on Zionism and Racism

On November 10, 1975, the General Assembly voted 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions) to approve a resolution declaring that Zionism is a form of racism. The full text of the resolution and the roll-call vote on the resolution follow:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its Resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations declaration on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable and socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures,"

Recalling also that, in its Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism.

Taking note of the declaration of Mexico on the equality of women and their contribution to development and peace, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, and racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination."

Taking note also of Resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the assembly of heads of state and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its 12th ordinary session, held in Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being."

Taking note also of the political declaration and strategy to strengthen international peace and security and to intensify solidarity and mutual assistance among nonaligned countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of nonaligned countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned

Zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology.

Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

U.N. ROLL CALL

IN FAVOR—72

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burundi
Byelorussia
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chad
China
Congo
Cuba
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dahomey
Egypt
Eq. Guinea
Gambia
Germany, East
Grenada
Guinea

Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon
Libya
Madagascar
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Oman

Pakistan
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Rwanda
Sao Tome
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Somalia
Southern Yemen
Soviet Union
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Tanzania
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Yugoslavia

OPPOSED—35

Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Barbados
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Cen. Afr. Rep.
Costa Rica
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Salvador

Fiji
Finland
France
Germany, West
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Liberia

Luxembourg
Malawi
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Swaziland
Sweden
United States
Uruguay

ABSTENTIONS—32

Argentina
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Burma
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana

Greece
Guatemala
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Lesotho
Mauritius
Nepal
Papua N. Guinea
Paraguay
Peru

Philippines
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad-Tobago
Upper Volta
Venezuela
Zaire
Zambia

Absent—Rumania, South Africa, Spain.

Israeli Statement on the Resolution on Zionism and Racism

During the debate on the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism, Chaim Herzog of Israel attacked the resolution. Excerpts from his speech follow:

The resolution before the Third Committee was originally a resolution condemning racism and colonialism, a subject in which consensus could have been achieved, a consensus which is of great importance to all of us, and to our African colleagues in particular. However, instead of this being permitted to happen, a group of countries, drunk with the feeling of power inherent in the automatic majority and without regard to the importance of achieving a consensus on this issue, railroaded the committee in a contemptuous

maneuver by the use of the automatic majority into bracketing Zionism with the subject under discussion. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of this base move with any measure of restraint.

Zionism is the name of the national movement of the Jewish people and is the modern expression of the ancient Jewish heritage. The Zionist ideal, as set out in the Bible, has been and is an integral part of the Jewish religion.

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LEBANON

(Continued from page 9)

issued an early appeal for peace, declaring that the disturbances benefited only the Zionist enemy. Egypt has been troubled by the involvement of Syria and Libya, both of whom have been at odds with Sadat. Libya's Prime Minister Muammar el-Qaddafi evidently wants a Muslim-dominated state in Lebanon; to this end he has contributed an estimated \$30 million to \$40 million to Lebanese politicians, commando groups, and anti-Egyptian newspapers.³² Iraq has also aided leftist opposition groups and has denounced Syrian mediation. A meeting of Arab foreign ministers in October failed to resolve the complex situation.

LEBANON AND THE SUPERPOWERS

Great power involvement in Lebanon has been limited. A minor military purchase agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union in late 1971, and the Soviets have offered on several occasions to strengthen Lebanon's defenses against Israel, but nothing has come of these efforts. During the current domestic crisis, the Soviets reportedly have funneled considerable aid through the Lebanese Communist party.

In marked contrast to her intervention in 1958, the United States role in Lebanon has been discreet, if not trouble free. The constant Israeli attacks have dampened United States-Lebanese relations, and Lebanon opposed the United States supply of military equipment to Israel during the October war. Publicly, Washington has adopted an "even-handed" approach to the southern Lebanese situation. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson declared in June, 1974, for instance, that "We deplore very strongly the continuing action-reaction cycle of violence across the Lebanon-Israeli border."³³ In blunt contrast, Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota, himself of Lebanese extraction, denounced Israeli actions as "barbaric and arrogant and savage."³⁴ Left-wing violence against United States installations and personnel in Lebanon has recently increased. The Socialist Revolutionary Organization attacked the Bank of America in Beirut during the October war, causing the deaths of an American hostage and several others. In late June, 1975, an American Army colonel was kidnapped and held for ransom for several days.

³² *The New York Times*, September 13, 1975, and October 5, 1975.

³³ *The Washington Post*, June 21, 1974.

³⁴ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 4 (Autumn, 1974), p. 5.

³⁵ *The National Observer*, January 18, 1975.

Despite its lowered profile, the United States has not lost interest in Lebanon, if only because the latter has now become a powder keg that could destroy American peace efforts in the region. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly assured the Lebanese during a December, 1973, visit that the United States would not permit Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.³⁵ Since 1973, the United States has made military credits available, has offered to sell a squadron of A-4 Skyhawk jets, and has supplied sophisticated anti-tank missiles to the Lebanese army. In the present circumstances, the United States has worked to preserve stability without becoming openly involved.

THE FUTURE

To the outsider, it seems clear that Lebanon can never be the same again. The killing and destruction have probably been too great to allow a return to the old confessional relationships and haphazard manner of running the country. Major political reform may have to await the next parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for April and August, 1976, respectively, but there must be reform if the country is to survive as a democratic state, or even to survive at all. However, it is perhaps too much to expect Lebanon to manage a peaceful transformation, buffeted as she is by the crosscurrents of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict and faced with the pressures of sectarian ambition in a small, conservative, partly traditional society. ■

ISRAEL

(Continued from page 13)

would occupy captured Syrian territory indefinitely.

Other parts of the Sinai agreements were, from the Israeli standpoint, equally promising. For example, in a Memorandum of Agreement between Israel and the United States, dated September 1, 1975, supplementing the Sinai agreements, the United States has pledged the following: to make "every effort to be fully responsive within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis, to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs." Given the Ford administration's heavy commitment, the comparative absence of any opposition or even of serious debate in the Congress or on the national scene, and the effectiveness of the Israeli lobby in Washington, this agreement is as close to an American carte blanche support of Israel as is conceivable.

In the area of Israeli oil supplies, the United States has undertaken to guarantee for five years Israel's oil supplies in unspecified amounts, to transport the oil

or to arrange for its transport, to include Israel's annual oil and transportation costs in yearly requests for congressional appropriations for economic support of Israel, and to pay for the cost of storage facilities to be built in Israel and capable of holding a year's oil reserves. It is difficult to find such a far-reaching commitment, so tightly binding on the United States and so generous with American money, anywhere else in the record of American diplomatic history. Moreover, as winter approaches, American citizens in the industrialized Northeast may wish that their fuel needs would be cared for as well as those of Israel over the next five years.

Another great success for Israel is the agreement with the United States on armaments. The language of the agreement is plain: "The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength, through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft." In addition, the United States has promised unspecified amounts of other sophisticated military technology to Israel, like the new Pershing ground-to-ground missiles. By the time this weapons procurement program has run a few years, Israel's military arsenal will bristle with the latest and most devastating equipment. One very ominous sign emerges from all this rattling of new sabers. The Pershing ground-to-ground missiles are extremely sophisticated, have a range of 500 miles, possess a nearly infallible guidance system, and are so costly that to equip them with anything but the nuclear warheads for which they were expressly designed would be economic insanity. It is only necessary to refer to a December, 1974, speech of the President of Israel, Ephraim Katzir, to see the possible implications of placing these weapons in the hands of the Israelis. Speaking to a group of Western science writers, President Katzir said:

It has always been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear weapons development. We now have that potential. We will defend this country with all possible means at hand. We have to develop more powerful and new arms to protect ourselves.

Thanks to seemingly unlimited American support, Israel has indeed scored some resounding diplomatic and economic triumphs. Nearly any Israeli request receives automatic American compliance. The Arabs must adapt to this Israeli fait accompli. Egypt is in the process of making such an adaptation, and Israel has in effect challenged Syria and the Palestinians to do otherwise. If all works out according to the American-backed Israeli plan, Israel's leaders anticipate a new era of security based on an overwhelming Israeli military superiority in the face of any possible combination of enemies. If, however, the grand plan in its main outlines is not fulfilled, Israel and her Arab neighbors will face increased tension

and the likelihood of renewed war. Obviously, 1976 will be the year to test the validity of the plan and the intricate pattern of assumptions on which it is based. ■

EGYPT

(Continued from page 17)

Every hotel in Cairo is packed, either with tourists or with businessmen interested in investing but reluctant to sign contracts. There are two reasons for this reluctance; the residual uncertainty over a possible new war, particularly one started by Syria that might compel Egypt to take up the fight again; and the bureaucratic inertia that is Nasser's legacy, characterized by an abnormally high level of overt or disguised unemployment that perpetuates inefficiency and low productivity. By law Egyptian workers cannot be fired. After they work for a year, they have permanent jobs. This makes control of the labor force impossible for commercial investors. The government is hesitant about changing the law because change may aggravate an already tight employment situation or threaten the socioeconomic advances of the Nasser period.

Bureaucratic inefficiency borders on the scandalous. For example, the land reclamation program has squandered tens of millions of dollars because of poor planning, excessive government interference, and a lack of technically trained personnel. The chief of the Reconstruction and Agricultural Projects Commission admitted that his group had "exhausted all the High Dam waters without adding a single feddan to Egypt's agricultural land." In addition, because of inertia and red tape, government ministries have not utilized all the available foreign credits.

Egypt's physical problems are staggering. The transportation situation in Cairo, a city of almost seven million, grows steadily worse, notwithstanding the importation of hundreds of new buses from Iran and West Europe. Cairo has no subway system and must rely on antiquated, overused and undermaintained buses. There are frequent delays and disturbances on the heavily burdened trains carrying workers between Cairo and Helwan (the iron and steel complex outside the capital). Egyptians who can afford cars or cabs use them. The poorer sections of Cairo are without running water and are subjected to frequent electrical breakdowns. Shortages are common: tea, cooking oil, sugar, tomatoes, meat, and chicken are moving beyond the price range of the average Egyptian and are difficult to secure. During the food and wage riots in Cairo in early January, 1975, the targets were indiscriminate, including the Soviet bookshop and the Air France offices in the heart of the city. The rioters chanted in Arabic: "Hegazi [who was then the Prime Min-

ister], Hegazi, the Nazi regime was no worse than Hegazi."

Egypt's hard currency earnings are still low, given the country's needs. The Suez Canal, reopened on June 5, 1975, may provide a much needed infusion, but until the Canal is deepened and widened so that it can handle supertankers (the \$1.5 billion required for this priority project is still not in hand), its full potential will not be realized. Sadat has commitments of \$4 billion to \$5 billion, but these must be doubled and tripled in the years ahead if significant progress is to be made. The proposal to build a 200-mile pipeline from a terminal west of Alexandria to the Gulf of Suez, which had apparently been contracted for in 1971, is still very much an on-again, off-again project. Construction has started, but no one is venturing to set a completion date. Finally, the intensifying civil strife in Lebanon is occasioning a flight of capital and commercial expertise from Lebanon that might relocate permanently in Cairo.

OBSERVATIONS

In April, 1974, Sadat issued a 20,000-word document, called "The October Paper" to symbolize his contention that the October War had ushered in a new era for Egypt. The document called for extensive reforms and held out the promise of a better life for the Egyptian people. Sadat reshuffled his Cabinet, issued decrees aimed at streamlining the procedures of economic ministries, and stressed a campaign to raise productivity in all sectors of the economy. The effects remain conspicuous more by their absence than by their influence on entrenched practices and sluggish ministerial mastodons.

Sadat is beset by mounting domestic troubles and heedful of the need to cater to those groups on whom he rests his power. He is sensitive to the conflicting tugs from turbulent and powerful forces in the Arab world, but he is convinced that he has already obtained more from encouraging Kissinger's diplomacy and the direct involvement of the United States than he could hope to garner from another war. Thus Sadat is a man endlessly in search of more attractive political and economic options. Politically, Egypt's mood is uncharacteristically grave. The jokes that were staples of any conversation have virtually disappeared, but Sadat himself remains popular.

Sadat has shown himself a skillful diplomat and an astute politician. When few saw any future for him, he initiated war in October, 1973, unhinging the apparent stalemate, and in the process he obtained new advantages, allies in the Arab world, and respect abroad. Once again, he faces a critical period, one whose challenge is perhaps even more arduous; certainly, it is more complex. His success or failure in the months ahead will shape Egypt's policy for years to come. ■

MIDDLE EAST OIL

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The consumers, for their part, seemed to draw back from the brink of open economic confrontation; in October, they agreed to discuss the broad range of issues raised at the OPEC summit, issues that they had refused to discuss in April. Strong political and economic measures against OPEC members were discussed. In the end, either by accident or design, the economic confrontation was confined, to a further period of testing the impact of market forces on the producers. When OPEC's solidarity was emphatically reaffirmed by Saudi Arabia, the consumers quickly moved toward a more conciliatory policy.

Saudi Arabia's importance as the key member of OPEC, both politically and economically, was increasingly obvious. This fact was both good news and bad news for the consumers. It was good insofar as the Saudis have been inclined toward friendship with the United States because the United States is their principal partner in development, the leader of the non-Communist world, and the power most likely to induce Israel to make an acceptable settlement with the Arab states. There was, however, a danger that the Saudis would link their moderate stand in OPEC to a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict—a conflict that had defied all settlement efforts for nearly 30 years.

In 1975, the OPEC members and the oil-consuming nations gained a further understanding of the sensitivities, strengths and weaknesses of their partners and their adversaries in the oil dialogue. Each will approach the coming negotiations with fewer illusions and a greater sense of reality. ■

THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

(Continued from page 21)

"new and untested source," however, the CIA informed the State Department that Ioannides had abandoned his coup plans, at least for the time being. On the basis of that single report, which was widely disseminated, no preventive action was taken by the State Department, with the result that the U.S. government was caught "off guard" when the coup occurred.

During the first two weeks of July, not a single CIA report predicted a coup despite the mounting evidence, which, according to its own report, the intelligence community had chosen to ignore. Sensing trouble, Makarios had already written and made public a letter³⁰ to Greek President Phaedon Ghizikis,

³⁰ For the text, dated July 2, See *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, August 12-18, 1974, pp. 26661-62.

accusing Athens and the Greek officers in Cyprus of subversive activities against the state and against his own person. Makarios demanded the recall of those officers, 650 in number; a deadline of July 20 was set, although it was not included in the letter. Turkey, apparently in possession of superior intelligence, was massing her invasion forces, expecting the coup to provide her with a long-awaited pretext for invading Cyprus. Intelligence on the Turkish preparations, although it was kept from the American ambassador in Athens, was conveyed to Washington. Yet the policy of the State Department was still based on the "new and untested source" in Athens—that the coup would not be carried out.

With regard to the activities of the intelligence community during the Cyprus crisis, a study of the hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence strongly suggests that either the CIA was guilty of gross mismanagement in failing to supply the State Department with the correct data, or it acquiesced and possibly favored the coup and the invasion.

In Cyprus, as the deadline to the Greek government approached, apprehension mounted. No answer to Makarios's letter had been received. A suggestion to sabotage the armory of the National Guard and of the Greek contingent was rejected on the grounds that it would endanger the national security and provide the coupists with a pretext.

The coup d'état was launched on Monday, July 15, at eight o'clock in the morning. Resistance was heavy but futile against the tanks of the National Guard. The President, whose office was a prime target, managed to escape through an unguarded side entrance.

In Cyprus, the coupists installed Nikos Sampson as President. Sampson was an enosis extremist who had been a prominent member of the EOKA movement of the 1950's. A person of ill-repute and a sympathizer of EOKA-B, he was not a member of the organization nor was he one of the conspirators. He was installed in office by default, after many other "candidates" had refused to take over.³¹

Most governments condemned the coup, and it was strongly urged that the Makarios regime be restored to power. The only exceptions were the governments of Greece and the United States. Greece denied any involvement and called the coup an "internal affair"

of Cyprus. Nonetheless, under mounting international pressure, Greece offered to replace but not withdraw her officers from Cyprus—an indirect admission of her involvement. The United States, although it emphasized its support for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, essentially supported the Greek position.³² It was not until after the Turkish invasion that Washington publicly acknowledged that Greece was indeed responsible for the Cyprus coup.

During the five days between the coup and the Turkish invasion, the attitude of the United States was of crucial importance since the United States was the only country with influence in both Athens and Ankara. Unfortunately, the United States chose to follow a policy that can only be described as an exercise in ambiguity. The coup was not condemned; yet the United States did not recognize the Sampson regime, even after it had effective control of Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios was considered "politically dead" by State Department decision makers; but his status as President was left deliberately vague. Despite persistent questioning by newsmen, a State Department spokesman refused to give a yes or no answer to the crucial question as to whether the United States still recognized Makarios as the President of Cyprus.

This ambivalent United States policy plus newspaper reports that the State Department was tilting toward Greece and the Sampson regime (which was indeed the case) led Ankara to conclude that the Greeks, with American acquiescence, were about to present Turkey with enosis as a *fait accompli*. The Turkish Prime Minister had gone to London in an apparent effort to convince Britain to take joint action (with Turkey) in Cyprus, since both were guarantor powers, but Britain would not take this step.

Turkey began landing troops on Cyprus on July 20 and fighting broke out soon thereafter.³³ The Security Council was called into session and unanimously adopted Resolution 353(1974), which demanded "an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus." In addition, the Security Council called for the withdrawal without delay of all foreign military personnel from the republic, including those requested by President Makarios; it also called on Greece, Turkey and Great Britain "... to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. ..." A cease-fire agreed on with United States mediation was set for July 22.

By then, the Turkish forces, with complete naval and air superiority (in the absence of any by the National Guard), had occupied a substantial part of Cypriot territory and had linked up with the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia.

³¹ His friendship with Ioannides was probably a determining factor in his ascent to the "presidency."

³² Ambassador John Scali at the U.N. Security Council stated that his government "had always opposed intervention in the internal affairs of one country by another, and to the extent that this may be the case in Cyprus ... we deplore it." See USUN Press Release of July 19, 1974.

³³ At the time of the invasion, Undersecretary Joseph Sisco was in the area trying to defuse the crisis. He had no leverage, however, since the United States had refused to condemn the coup and he was not authorized to threaten the Turks with a cut off in aid if they invaded. His only leverage was to cut off arms to both Greece and Turkey if they went to war against each other.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit accepted the cease-fire. Under the pressure of the Turkish invasion, the Sampson regime collapsed on July 23. Sampson was replaced by Glafkos Klerides who, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, was entitled to exercise presidential powers until Makarios's return.

At about the same time, the Ioannides regime was handing power in Greece to a civilian government headed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, a self-exiled former Premier who was recalled from Paris to assume power.³⁴

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 353, the guarantor powers met in Geneva from July 25 to July 30. Although they reaffirmed Resolution 353, they also negated it by calling for "the timely and phased reduction" of armed forces in Cyprus instead of for their immediate withdrawal, as demanded by the Security Council.³⁵

The Geneva conference and the Vienna conference that followed (August 8 to 13) reflected one new crucial element, namely, Turkish power. According to Prime Minister Ecevit, Turkish power was "irrevocably established." Great Britain and Greece, through their words and deeds, made it clear that they would not intervene as guarantor powers. Turkey was therefore left alone to impose her will on Cyprus. Any vestiges of legality that Turkey had claimed during the first stages of the invasion (until the collapse of the Sampson regime and the convening of the Geneva conference) were contradicted by Turkish activities on Cyprus. Turkey did send troops to Cyprus "with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty," as her

treaty obligations clearly stipulated. Rather, Turkey was acting clearly to change that "state of affairs," to reflect her exclusive interests. The Turkish salient kept expanding, and thousands of Turkish troops poured into Cyprus despite the cease-fire agreement.³⁶

From this position of strength, Turkey demanded a cantonal or a biregional solution, in which approximately 34 percent of Cyprus would be under Turkish Cypriot control.* In either case, a minimum or a maximum compulsory movement of indigenous population would have been necessary. The Greek Cypriots responded with proposals that conceded administrative autonomy, with a cantonal arrangement, but that excluded a geographical area or compulsory movement of population. The Turkish Foreign Minister insisted that his proposals required an answer within a short time. On behalf of the Greek Cypriot delegation, Klerides emphasized that he did not reject the Turkish proposals, but needed 48 hours for consultations. The request was not granted, and the conference collapsed on the morning of August 14.³⁷ Soon thereafter, a Turkish attack sliced Cyprus in two, giving the Turkish Army control of about 40 percent of Cypriot territory.

Turkey justified her second attack on the grounds that her proposals had been rejected and that any delay endangered her troops and the encircled Turkish Cypriots. It is hard to see how the vastly outnumbered and out-gunned Cypriot National Guard threatened the Turkish Army; it is even clearer that the second attack could hardly have been launched to protect the Turkish Cypriots. To protect them, Turkish forces should have attacked the Paphos and Limassol districts where the majority of the Turkish Cypriots lived and continued to live after the cessation of hostilities. Instead, the aim was clearly political: to slice Cyprus in two to provide the basis for a biregional geographical federation or confederation, a basis that did not exist until the Turkish invasion.³⁸ The invasion was necessary, as was the expulsion of the indigenous Greek Cypriot population. For, unless the Greek Cypriots were expelled, even if all the Turkish Cypriots (a total of 115,000) gathered in the Turkish-occupied north, they would still be outnumbered by the Greek Cypriots of that region, about 200,000, who are now refugees in Cyprus. It was not the calamity of war that made them refugees, but rather the design of the invasion.³⁹

More than a year later, prospects for a viable peaceful political settlement seem very bleak. The inter-communal talks resumed under the auspices of the Secretary General. They have achieved no progress so far except on humanitarian needs and the reopening of the international airport for the needs of UN-FICYP. Guarded hopes for a settlement during the last meeting, which took place in New York last September, were dashed when Denktash failed to

* The area, slightly less than that which the Turkish Army now controls, includes about 70 percent of the cultivated land. In addition, it includes the industrial and tourist centers that support the Cyprus economy.

³⁴ The backstage maneuvers for the changes in Cyprus and Greece are still not clear. It is a fact, however, that Ioannides had ordered an attack on Turkey that the Greek generals refused to implement.

³⁵ The text of the Geneva Declaration can be found in *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, August-September, 1974, p. 48.

³⁶ By August 14, when the second Turkish attack was launched, there were approximately 40,000 Turkish troops backed by about 400 tanks in Cyprus. More than a year later, Turkish power was unchanged.

³⁷ The presentation on the negotiations is based on the account of the British delegate to the U.N., whose country requested an urgent meeting of the Council to put on record the reason for the failure of the conferences. See *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, *ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

³⁸ It is not coincidental that the Attila line that presently divides Cyprus reflects the demands of the Turkish Cypriots as officially presented to U.N. mediator Galo Plaza in 1965. See paragraph 73, p. 220, of his report to the Secretary General, *ibid.*

³⁹ This had been arranged during the third session of the talks at Vienna early in August, 1975. At the time, an agreement provided for the transfer of all Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north and a promise that the 10,000 Greek Cypriots left in the north would not be expelled.

fulfill an obligation to present definite proposals on his views. At the time of this writing the talks are deadlocked.

The most important reason for the current deadlock is the Turkish refusal to consider any meaningful concessions, like the partial withdrawal from some occupied territory. With a series of faits accomplis, particularly the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot federated state in the area under the control of the Turkish Army, Turkey is strengthening her negotiating position to achieve her current goal: the acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of a biregional federation linked with a very weak central government. The Greek Cypriots, having no leverage except the fact that the Cyprus government is recognized as the only legal government in Cyprus, have for practical purposes conceded to all Turkish demands. To sign a settlement, however, they insist on some minimal demands: the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish Army so that a sense of security can return; the return of the Famagusta and Morphou regions and the freedom to travel and trade over the dividing line so that the small Cypriot economy can become viable; and the acceptance in principle of the voluntary return of refugees to their homes.

The alternative to a settlement will be the continuation of the present situation. Time works for the Turkish side and to the detriment of the Greek Cypriots. The latter's position is further weakened because of emigration: this, plus the immigration of Turkish colonizers from Turkey, may soon change their majority.⁴⁰ Despite all these problems, they would rather live with the present situation than legalize a "settlement" that will not be significantly different.

⁴⁰ More than 20,000 Greek Cypriots have emigrated so far. On the other hand, it appears that a colonization program has begun in the north of Cyprus. Turkish authorities refuse to comment other than to say that the mainland Turks are "seasonal workers." See the account of John Hooper of the *Manchester Guardian*, "Migrants Peril Cyprus Talks," in the *Washington Post*, October 16, 1975. Judging from reports from the north, the Turkish immigration is greatly resented by Turkish Cypriots, who may themselves be outnumbered soon.

⁴¹ Sensitive to his socialist beliefs, Ecevit labeled the invasion a "peacekeeping operation." In its aftermath, he resigned as Prime Minister, hoping to cash in on his popularity at the polls and to get rid of Erbakan and his extremist coalition government. Fear of Ecevit, however, had united all other parties, and the dissolution of the chamber was not voted as Ecevit planned. The next general elections are not scheduled until 1977.

⁴² The whole issue of the arms embargo and its relation to the Cyprus issue is too complicated to be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that the administration never used it as the leverage it was intended to be, but fought bitterly to achieve its removal.

⁴³ Prior to the lifting of the embargo, Kissinger told President Makarios at the U.N. that once the embargo was lifted, "I shall mount a momentous effort and I will do whatever is in my power—I don't promise anything—I may succeed; I may fail."

The key to any settlement does not of course lie within Cyprus. The government in Ankara makes policy, and Turkey's internal instability is not at all conducive to a policy of "concession" in Cyprus. Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel's Justice party was strengthened during the mid-term Senate elections of October 12, 1975. However, his right-wing coalition government still depends on the support of Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The latter's National Salvation party fared badly in the elections, but Erbakan still holds the balance and he regards the fact that the Turkish Army did not conquer all of Cyprus as a large enough concession to the Greek Cypriots. Bulent Ecevit, the Prime Minister who ordered the Turkish invasion, is Demirel's bitterest enemy and is more than ready to denounce any yielding of conquered territory. His Republican People's party has also been strengthened, but it is not strong enough to force the dissolution of the Chamber, which, in turn, would necessitate new general elections. Ecevit counts on winning the next general elections because of his popularity in the aftermath of the Cyprus invasion.⁴¹

Turkey's pressing social and economic needs may and should take priority over Cyprus, which is a drain on her economy. In this case, a grand coalition between Demirel and Ecevit will not be unlikely. Ecevit may agree to support concessions put forward by Demirel in exchange for a promise of quick elections. The army, all suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, would welcome a bipartisan initiative that would produce movement toward a solution. If a "grand coalition" emerges, Erbakan's veto will be eliminated. All this, however, is sheer speculation except for the fact that a bipartisan policy on behalf of the two major parties is needed to break the deadlock.

Aside from the exigencies of the Turkish internal situation, Turkey is under "pressure" from Washington to show some good faith in the aftermath of the partial lifting by the United States of its arms embargo.⁴² The embargo had been imposed by the United States Congress because Turkey violated American laws and bilateral agreements by using American-supplied weapons in the invasion of Cyprus.

United States Secretary Henry Kissinger himself had to show that "some progress" had been made on Cyprus to ward off congressional criticism that might affect the foreign aid appropriations hearings scheduled for December. In addition, Kissinger has undertaken privately to do all that is in his power to achieve a solution.⁴³

Assuming that a compromise settlement can be reached, international guarantees must form an integral part of it. They cannot take the form of the Zurich-London guarantees, which have amply demonstrated their bankruptcy: all three guarantor powers,

by omission or commission, have violated what they purported to guarantee and have failed to honor their obligations toward Cyprus. Future guarantees must reflect the balance of interests in the regional and global conflicts, and must depend on the principle of unanimity for any action. It is unlikely that Britain will be willing to participate in any future arrangements. Greece, Turkey, the United States and the Soviet Union all have interests in Cyprus and can form a "balanced" arrangement with the approval of the Security Council, if they act in good faith and with a desire to alleviate suffering on Cyprus. The involvement of the superpowers may be regarded as an "experiment" to see how to tackle the question of guarantees for a Middle East settlement. The question of such guarantees will inevitably arise if a long-lasting solution to that region's problems is to be achieved.

The highly politicized conflict in Cyprus may defy solution. The prospects for a settlement are by no means hopeful. For the time being, Turkish power is the only reality in the country. A settlement extracted on the basis of such reality may last a long while, but it will not be long-lasting. In the meantime, while Cyprus awaits her peace-makers, electric power from the south supplies the needs of the whole island, while water from the north quenches the thirst of the land and people in the plains surrounding Nicosia. ■

SINAI AGREEMENT

(Continued from page 34)

in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and main-

tenance of these stations:

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 4)

This reflected the assessment of the Ford administration that there was a critical need for action and indicated that the extensive and intensive post-October War Middle East policy of the United States continue. Kissinger articulated the rationale when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 7, 1975:

... for the most basic reasons of national policy we owe it to the American people to do all we can to insure that the Middle East moves toward peace and away from conflict.¹³

¹³ *Ibid.*

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1975, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (EEC)

Nov. 6—The 9 member nations of the European Economic Community approve the sale by the member nations of farm surpluses, particularly the sale of 1 million tons of grain a year to Egypt for the next 3 years at controlled prices.

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Nov. 6—6 nations in the European Free Trade Association agree in ministerial session at Geneva to establish a \$100-million fund for the "development and restructuring of" Portugal's industry; Portugal is the 7th member of EFTA.

International Food Investment Fund

Nov. 1—Meeting in Rome, representatives of 69 nations agree to establish a \$1.2-billion investment fund to help grow food in the poorest nations of the world.

Middle East

(See *U.N.*)

Rambouillet Economic Conference

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 17—At the end of 3 days of meetings in Rambouillet, France, the leaders of the 6 richest non-Communist countries—Japan, the United States, France, West Germany, Italy and Britain—pledge to work closely together to "assure the recovery" of their economies and to keep them on a path of steady growth.

United Nations

(See also *Morocco; Surinam; U.S., Administration, Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 4—In debate in the General Assembly, the Egyptian delegate suggests that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be invited to participate in the Geneva conference on the Middle East.

Nov. 6—The U.S. formally notifies the International Labor Organization that it intends to withdraw.

Nov. 8—The Food and Agriculture Organization's governing conference gives the PLO observer status.

Nov. 10—The General Assembly votes 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions, to approve a resolution declaring that Zionism is a form of racism. The U.S. opposes the resolution. (For the complete text of the resolution, see p. 35.)

Nov. 12—The U.S. introduces a draft resolution at the General Assembly urging the release of all political prisoners everywhere in the world.

Nov. 18—The General Assembly adopts conflicting resolutions on Korea; both North and South Korea claim victory. Both resolutions call for the dissolution of the U.N. Command set up in 1950 to preserve the armistice.

Nov. 21—The U.S. withdraws its resolution on political prisoners, because amendments have made it a "travesty."

Nov. 27—The 3-week conference of the U.N. Food and Ag-

ricultural Organization concludes in Rome without significant progress.

Nov. 30—The Security Council agrees to extend the mandate of the peace-keeping force on the Golan Heights for 6 months.

ALGERIA

(See *Morocco*)

ANGOLA

(See also *Portuguese Territories, Angola; Uganda*)

Nov. 11—2 rival groups proclaim themselves to be the new government of Angola: Agostinho Neto, head of the Soviet-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), declares that he is President and the capital is Luanda; a pro-Western group and a Chinese-backed group form a coalition government known as the Democratic People's Republic and name Huambo (known as Nova Lisboa since 1928) as the capital.

Nov. 20—In Washington, D.C., U.S. government officials report that Cuba has sent 3,000 soldiers and advisers and the Soviet Union has sent arms to support MPLA.

Nov. 28—In Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says that "the U.S. will not intervene militarily in Angola" although it objects to the Soviet involvement there.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 1—The Radical party demands that a congressional committee investigate charges of corruption against the administration of President Isabel Martínez de Perón.

Nov. 3—Perón is admitted to a private clinic, because she is suffering from "an acute gall bladder condition."

Nov. 4—From her hospital bed, Perón authorizes a pay increase for laborers 40 percent higher than wage and price guidelines announced by the government 10 days ago.

Nov. 8—The Chamber of Deputies receives a motion from a minor opposition party calling for the impeachment of the President.

Nov. 18—The administration announces that general elections will be held before the end of 1976, several months before they were originally scheduled.

AUSTRALIA

Nov. 3—Prime Minister Gough Whitlam continues to refuse the demands of Liberal party leader Malcolm Fraser that he resign and hold national elections.

Nov. 11—Governor General Sir John Kerr dismisses Prime Minister Whitlam and dissolves both houses of Parliament. This is the 1st time in the country's history as a federation that the Governor General has used his power to remove a Prime Minister.

Malcolm Fraser is sworn in as interim Prime Minister. Elections are scheduled before the end of the year.

BANGLADESH

Nov. 6—President Khandaker Moshtaque Ahmed is re-

placed as President by Supreme Court Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammed Sayem who is supported by the new army leaders. He dissolves Parliament and promises to hold elections by 1977.

Nov. 7—In a radio broadcast, President Sayem says that he will rule under martial law with the assistance of members of the armed forces.

BELIZE

(See *Guatemala; United Kingdom*)

CAMBODIA

Nov. 1—At the end of a Cambodian visit to Bangkok, Cambodian and Thai diplomats issue a joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations between the 2 countries.

CANADA

Nov. 20—Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources Alastair Gillespie announces a reduction in the amount of oil that will be permitted to be exported to the U.S. Effective January 1, 1976, the U.S. will receive one-third less Canadian oil; the flow will be cut off entirely by 1981.

CHILE

Nov. 15—The military junta bans the publication of all information about Roman Catholic nuns and priests and civilians accused of aiding leftist rebels.

CHINA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 3—The government admits that 4 Indian soldiers were killed at a border check post in October. The foreign ministry spokesman accuses the Indian soldiers of crossing into Chinese territory and opening fire.

COLOMBIA

Nov. 3—An executive of Sears Roebuck is released by his kidnappers after almost 3 months of captivity.

CUBA

(See *Angola; U.S., Political Scandal*)

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, EEC, U.N.; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 22—In Cairo, Egyptian and Soviet officials begin talks on rescheduling the payment of Egypt's military debts to the U.S.S.R.

FINLAND

Nov. 30—A 5-party "national emergency" coalition government is formed under Prime Minister Martti J. Miettunen of the Center party. Four of the 18 Cabinet members are Communists.

GUATEMALA

Nov. 6—President Kjell Laugerud Garcia warns the British government against continuing the British troop buildup in neighboring Belize. He says that Guatemala is prepared "to meet force with force."

Nov. 30—In Mexico City, Guatemala and Britain agree to resume negotiations on the future of Belize.

INDIA

(See also *China*)

Nov. 7—The Supreme Court unanimously rules against the conviction of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 2 electoral offenses in June.

Nov. 12—Jaya Prakash Narayan, the 73-year old opposition leader, is released on parole from jail, where he has been held for 5 months. He pledges to continue to oppose the Prime Minister. He is the first of the political prisoners arrested in June to be released.

Nov. 30—President Indira Gandhi reshuffles her Cabinet. She imposes federal rule in Uttar Pradesh.

IRAN

Nov. 30—Iran agrees to establish a 1,000-mile natural gas pipeline to the U.S.S.R.; more than \$400-million worth of natural gas will be supplied yearly through the pipeline to the Soviet Union, which will then pipe an identical amount to West Germany, Austria and France.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 2—For the 1st time in 15 years, an Israeli-bound cargo ship travels through the Suez Canal.

Nov. 11—In Jerusalem, the Knesset votes to reject the anti-Zionism resolution passed in the U.N. General Assembly. The Knesset also votes to abstain from Middle East peace talks in Geneva if the Palestine Liberation Organization participates.

Nov. 14—Israeli soldiers withdraw from the Sudr oilfields, the 1st actual withdrawal under the September 4 Sinai agreement with Egypt.

Nov. 30—Israel withdraws from the Abu Rudeis oilfield on the Gulf of Suez.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

LEBANON

Nov. 2—A special committee made up of representatives from rival groups attempts to enforce the 12th cease-fire since September.

Nov. 14—Sporadic fighting and acts of violence interrupt the 11-day-old truce.

Prime Minister Rashid Karami continues to refuse to call in the army to suppress the violence.

Nov. 15—Prime Minister Karami announces that he and President Suleiman Franjeh agree to discuss proposals for reforming the sectarian or confessional political system.

Nov. 22—The truce collapses as heavy fighting breaks out in Beirut; 27 people are killed and 32 are wounded.

Nov. 24—The fighting spreads to suburban areas; 8 more people are reported killed and 15 are wounded.

LIBYA

Nov. 7—The Occidental Petroleum Corporation reports that the government has altered its ruling; non-Libyan employees of the company will be permitted to leave the country.

MAURITANIA

(See *Morocco*)

MOROCCO

Nov. 1—The U.N. Security Council holds an emergency meeting to discuss the imminent invasion of the Spanish Sahara by Moroccan citizens. Algeria has threatened to go to war if the Moroccans and Mauritians are allowed to take over the area.

Nov. 2—In Madrid on his return from a visit to the Spanish Sahara, acting head of state Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón pledges to protect the legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the Spanish Sahara.

Nov. 5—Tens of thousands of Moroccans cross the border into the Spanish Sahara.

Nov. 6—The Moroccan marchers set up camps 6 miles inside Spanish territory.

Nov. 9—In several radio broadcasts, King Hassan II of Morocco asks his people to return to their base in Moroccan territory. He says the Sahara problem must be resolved by other methods.

Nov. 14—Spanish negotiators agree to turn over the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania by the end of February, 1976.

Nov. 17—Algerian authorities refuse to accept the agreement negotiated by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.

Nov. 19—Civilian marchers begin their return to Morocco. In a radio broadcast, King Hassan calls the march a success.

Nov. 22—King Hassan names Ahmed Bensouda, the director of the Cabinet, to be the governor of the Spanish Sahara.

NEW ZEALAND

Nov. 30—In an upset victory in yesterday's general election, the National party wins 53 of the 87 seats in the House of Representatives. Robert D. Muldoon will replace Labor party leader Wallace E. Rowling as Prime Minister.

PORTUGAL

(See also *Intl, EFTA*)

Nov. 7—In Lisbon, government soldiers blow up a transmitter of the radio station Rádio Renascença. The station was being used for anti-government and pro-Communist broadcasts by members of the extreme left wing.

Nov. 8—Military security forces are put on alert.

Nov. 12—In Lisbon, striking construction union workers storm the government's São Bento Palace and hold the Prime Minister and 200 deputies captive.

Nov. 14—The government agrees to the union's demands and grants a 40 percent wage increase across the board to the construction workers. The workers free their hostages.

Nov. 16—In Lisbon, the pro-Communist unions stage a massive demonstration, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister José Batista Pinheiro de Azevedo.

Nov. 20—The Prime Minister and his Cabinet refuse to carry on government business until they receive assurances from the President and the military that they will be given the support they need.

Nov. 21—The Revolutionary Council criticizes the Prime Minister's action and asks the Cabinet to resume work until an agreement can be reached.

President Francisco da Costa Gomes announces that the left-wing general, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, will be replaced by Brigadier Vasco Lourenço, a right-wing army officer.

Nov. 22—Under pressure from left-wing military units, the President reinstates General Saraiva de Carvalho.

Nov. 25—President Costa Gomes declares a state of emergency in the Lisbon military region as fighting breaks out between loyal government troops and rebellious supporters of the Portuguese Communist party and left-wing extremists. The President suspends all civil rights and imposes a curfew from midnight to 6 A.M. He bans all demonstrations and public meetings.

Nov. 27—President Costa Gomes announces that the rebellious troops have been put down by loyalist soldiers. Casualties are reported as light. Army Chief of Staff General Carlos Fabião is dismissed. General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is removed from his post as military security chief.

Nov. 28—As a result of the strong action taken by the military council against the left wing, the Prime Minister agrees to resume government business.

General António Ramalho Eanes is named army chief of staff.

Portuguese Territories

ANGOLA

Nov. 3—In Luanda, government officials indicate that the 3 warring groups have agreed to a cease-fire.

Nov. 10—Portugal grants Angola independence. She has been under Portuguese rule since 1575. (See *Angola*, p. 43.)

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

Nov. 28—The Timorese Liberation Front declares independence from Portugal and renames the country the People's Republic of East Timor.

Francisco Xavier Do Amaral is sworn in as President.

Nov. 29—In a statement in Lisbon, President Costa Gomes refuses to recognize the independence of Timor.

SAN MARINO

Nov. 10—3 Socialist ministers in the 10-member Cabinet resign.

Nov. 20—Parliament is dissolved.

SPAIN

(See also *Morocco*)

Nov. 3—The ailing Generalissimo Francisco Franco undergoes emergency surgery. He suffered an acute heart attack October 21.

Nov. 16—The government issues a decree making Spanish the country's official language.

Nov. 17—6 leftists are arrested and charged with subversive activities. In the last month, more than 120 people have been arrested.

Nov. 20—Generalissimo Francisco Franco dies after a long illness.

Nov. 22—Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón is sworn in as King Juan Carlos I, the 1st King of Spain in 44 years.

Nov. 25—The government grants clemency to some political prisoners and common criminals to mark the accession to the throne of Juan Carlos. Political terrorists are not released.

SURINAM

Nov. 25—This South American country becomes independent of the Netherlands and applies for membership in the United Nations.

SYRIA

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

THAILAND

(See *Cambodia*)

UGANDA

(See also *Angola*)

Nov. 9—President Idi Amin threatens to expel all Soviet diplomats and technicians if the U.S.S.R. does not explain its intervention in Angola. The Soviets demanded previously that Amin support the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

Nov. 11—The Soviet Union suspends diplomatic relations with Uganda, but recalls only its ambassador.

Nov. 17—Diplomatic relations are restored.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Angola; Egypt; Uganda; Yugoslavia*)

Nov. 7—For the 1st time in 15 years, there are no Soviet long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles in the annual Moscow celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Nov. 12—Physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, winner of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize, is refused permission to travel to Oslo to receive his prize.

Nov. 17—U.S. government officials report that the U.S.S.R. is supplying Syria with a squadron of advanced MIG-25 reconnaissance planes.

Nov. 19—A report by Amnesty International estimates that there are at least 10,000 political and religious prisoners in the U.S.S.R.

Nov. 20—The government publishes a new currency rule that severely limits the amount of foreign money gifts that can be received by Soviet citizens.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Guatemala*)

Nov. 1—The Ministry of Overseas Development issues a white paper that outlines plans to focus the British foreign aid program on the rural needs of the poorest nations. This is the 1st set of proposals on foreign aid in 8 years.

Nov. 3—In London, the 10th bomb in 2 months explodes, demolishing a lawyer's car.

Queen Elizabeth attends the official ceremony for the opening of the pipeline carrying North Sea oil to Britain.

Nov. 5—Prime Minister Harold Wilson announces a new economic program that stresses industrial output rather than social welfare programs.

British troops are sent to Belize (a self-governing British colony formerly known as British Honduras) in Central America, because of the danger of an invasion by Guatemala.

Nov. 14—The government reports a 25.9 percent rise in the retail price index for the 12 months ending October 31, 1975.

Nov. 19—A bomb explodes in a crowded restaurant in Chelsea; 2 people are killed and 17 injured.

Nov. 27—The government issues a white paper detailing its proposal to give Scotland and Wales some degree of home rule while keeping them within the United Kingdom.

Northern Ireland

Nov. 7—2 members of the Irish Republican Army release a hostage after 36 days. The kidnappers are arrested.

Nov. 12—The British government shuts down its truce monitoring stations; the IRA must sustain the truce.

UNITED STATES

Administration

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Nov. 2—President Gerald Ford fires Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby; he also removes Henry Kissinger from his post as national security adviser. Kissinger remains Secretary of State.

Nov. 3—Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon announces that the Treasury Department will issue \$2 bills in April, to commemorate the bicentennial and save some \$27 million in printing costs over a five-year period.

At a televised news conference, President Ford announces the nomination of White House chief of staff Donald H. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense; Richard B. Cheney, deputy assistant to the President, will replace Rumsfeld. He names George Bush, head of the U.S. delegation in Peking, to succeed Colby as director of the CIA. He names Elliot L. Richardson to replace Rogers C. B. Morton as Secretary of Commerce. In explanation of these changes, the President says that he "wanted a team that was my team."

Vice President Nelson Rockefeller says he will not be a candidate for the vice presidential nomination in 1976.

Nov. 6—A congressional study made public today reveals that over 50 percent of the personnel named to 9 federal regulatory agencies over the past 5 years first worked in the industries they were named to regulate. Substantial numbers returned to those industries at the end of their service with the agencies. Potential conflicts of interest are noted.

Nov. 7—The President says that his high-level personnel shifts do not indicate any change in U.S. defense policies.

Nov. 9—President Ford admits that "growing tension" in his Cabinet influenced his decision to replace Schlesinger.

Nov. 21—Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, declares that the nation's rivers and lakes are endangered by the use of polychlorinated biphenols; he urges a federal ban on the use of all PCB chemicals except in electrical transformers and capacitors.

Nov. 22—Schlesinger declares that the administration's budget for defense in 1977 is inadequate and says his view of the budget was "an important issue" in the President's decision to dismiss him.

Nov. 23—Schlesinger says that the defense budget proposed by the White House will require a reduction of 200,000 in the armed forces in fiscal 1977.

Nov. 24—At President Ford's request, U.S. representative at the U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan agrees to remain at the U.N.

Civil Rights

(See also *Political Scandal*)

Nov. 2—In Detroit, federal district court Judge Robert E. De Mascio rules that the Detroit school system must begin a student integration plan in January, 1976; this will affect some 28,300 students.

Nov. 11—The United States Civil Rights Commission reveals that it will undertake a major study of busing and school desegregation; findings will be issued in a report to the President, Congress and the nation in August, 1976.

Nov. 19—Assistant Deputy Director of the FBI James Adams says there was no "statutory basis or justification" for some 25 separate incidents of harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr., by the FBI over a 6-year period.

Economy

(See also *Legislation*)

Nov. 5—The Labor Department reports that the wholesale price index rose 1.8 percent in October; this was the largest monthly increase in a year.

New York Governor Hugh Carey asks the Federal Reserve Board in New York to invoke emergency procedures not used since the Great Depression to make 90-day loans totaling \$576 million to 4 state agencies in "imminent" danger of default.

Nov. 7—The Labor Department reports an 0.3 percent increase in the unemployment rate, to 8.6 percent, in October; this was the first rise in the rate in 4 months. The

- number of unemployed again reached the 8-million mark.
- Nov. 10—The Office of Management and Budget sends Congress an estimate that government spending will be between \$43 billion and \$46 billion in fiscal 1977. The fiscal 1977 budget deficit is estimated at between \$31 billion and \$51 billion.
- Nov. 14—In Washington, D.C., the Federal Reserve Board reports a 0.4 percent rise in industrial production in October, compared with an advance of 1.8 percent in September.
- Nov. 17—According to White House sources, President Gerald Ford is now considering short-term federal financial assistance to New York City—3-year loan guarantees in the amount of \$2.5 billion.
- Nov. 19—President Ford says that he will not support federal financial aid to New York City as of today but will reevaluate his position in another week if the city and New York state take "further concrete action."
- Nov. 20—The Labor Department reports an increase of 0.7 percent in the consumer price index in October.
- Nov. 26—The Commerce Department reports that for the ninth consecutive month, the U.S. showed a trade surplus. The October surplus was \$1.08 billion.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Intl Food Investment Fund, U.N.; Angola*)

- Nov. 5—Speaking to a joint session of Congress, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asks the U.S. to play a "more impartial role" in the Middle East, not to "condone expansion or tolerate aggression" and to be more understanding of the Palestinian cause.
- Nov. 7—At the U.N., Daniel P. Moynihan, chief U.S. delegate, promises to remember the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians in working for a peace settlement in the Middle East.
- Nov. 12—Condemning the U.N. vote equating Zionism with racism, Kissinger warns Americans not to take an extreme stand against the U.N.
- Nov. 16—President Ford is the opening speaker on energy problems at Rambouillet, 35 miles southwest of Paris, at the 6-nation economic summit meeting.
- Nov. 20—President Ford discloses measures to protect U.S. businesses and citizens against discrimination because of foreign boycotts, in an effort to dampen Arab discrimination against American Jews.
- Nov. 30—The President leaves for Peking after an overnight stop in Alaska.

Legislation

(See also *Political Scandal*)

- Nov. 4—Senator Frank Church (D., Id.) sends President Ford a 3-page letter formally refusing to keep secret the findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in assassination plots against foreign heads of state.
- Nov. 7—A federally funded Consolidated Rail Corporation, Conrail, is created to handle most rail freight-hauling in 17 states, in the absence of congressional action rejecting a reorganization plan for the railroads submitted 60 working days ago. Legislation implementing the plan must now be passed.
- Nov. 12—Voting 8 to 5, the Senate Banking Committee refuses to recommend the confirmation of Ben B. Blackburn to head the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
- Nov. 13—The President submits legislation to Congress to cut down federal regulation of interstate trucking and bus transportation; this legislation is part of a 3-part administration plan to reduce government restrictions in the railroad, airline and trucking industry.

- Nov. 18—The Senate approves the nomination of Donald H. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense.
- Nov. 20—The House Select Committee on Intelligence proceeds with the contempt citation against Secretary of State Kissinger for his refusal to honor a subpoena demanding certain documents; the full House must approve the citation before it becomes effective.
- Nov. 25—It is reported in Washington that former President Richard M. Nixon has agreed to testify before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, although he will reserve the right to refuse to answer certain questions.
- Nov. 26—President Gerald Ford proposes legislation to Congress that would provide \$2.3 billion in short-term seasonal loans for New York City, to be administered by Treasury Secretary William E. Simon. This would provide federal aid to New York to help the city avoid default on its obligations.
- At a White House news conference, President Ford urges that "some responsible group . . . investigate new developments" with regard to both the John Kennedy and the Martin Luther King, Jr., assassinations.
- Nov. 29—President Ford signs a bill extending for 3 years the 1965 Older Americans Act under which states receive federal grants for programs aiding older citizens.

Military

(See also *Administration*)

- Nov. 24—Dr. Fred C. Ikle, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaking in Milwaukee, says that the United States should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons against cities as a matter of "fundamental morality."

Political Scandal

- Nov. 6—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence discloses that since 1947 3 international telegraph and cable companies have secretly supplied the U.S. government with copies of cables sent to selected areas and individuals; the agreement is disclosed over the objections of the Ford administration and 3 Republican members of the committee.
- By a 7-3 vote, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct rules that no rules of Congress were violated by Representative Michael Harrington (D., Mass.) when he disclosed classified testimony about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert activities in Chile.
- Nov. 7—At a Senate committee hearing, Senator Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) makes public a document that shows that the CIA's secret drug-testing program included tests of mind-distorting drugs on unsuspecting persons.
- Nov. 12—Literary appraiser Ralph G. Newman is convicted in federal district court in Chicago on 2 charges of lying about his participation in preparing an illegal \$450,000-income tax deduction filed in April, 1970, by former President Richard Nixon.
- Nov. 17—Federal District Judge Gerhard Gesell refuses to order that the name of a specific individual be removed from a report of CIA involvement in political assassinations that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is about to make public.
- Nov. 18—Documents presented to the Senate Select Committee show that, as part of a 6-year campaign to discredit him, the Federal Bureau of Investigation attempted to persuade civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., to commit suicide by sending him an anonymous note and a tape of his involvement in alleged unsavory incidents 34 days before King was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Nov. 19—Saying that he fears retaliation from "unstable and extremist groups," CIA Director William Colby asks the Senate Select Committee not to make public the names of 12 individuals who were allegedly involved in assassination plots against foreign heads of state.

Nov. 20—The Senate Select Committee reports that it has found no evidence of authorization from the White House for any plots against Cuban Premier Castro's life.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence makes public its report that shows that officials of the U.S. government instigated assassination plots against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and President Patrice Lumumba of the Congo (now Zaire), and were involved in plotting against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Dominican President Rafael L. Trujillo, and Chilean General René Schneider. Except for Castro, all these leaders were eventually assassinated but the committee finds that no successful assassination resulted from plots initiated by the CIA.

Political Terrorism

Nov. 4—Lynette Fromme goes on trial in federal district court in Sacramento on a charge of attempted assassination of President Gerald Ford on September 5.

Nov. 14—President Gerald Ford testifies in a video-tape deposition that he has no recollection of hearing the click of a gun pointed at him by Lynette Fromme on September 5. This is the first time that a President has submitted to interrogation by lawyers in a criminal case.

Nov. 17—In San Francisco, federal district court Judge Samuel Conti rules that Sara Jane Moore is competent to stand trial for attempting to assassinate President Gerald Ford on September 22 in San Francisco.

Federal District Judge Oliver Carter delays the start of the trial of Patricia Hearst (on charges of armed bank robbery and the use of a gun to commit felony) from December 15 to January 26, 1976.

Nov. 24—The case of Lynette Fromme goes to the jury in Sacramento federal district court.

Nov. 26—A jury finds Lynette Fromme guilty of attempting to assassinate President Gerald Ford; she is the first person ever convicted of such a crime.

Politics

Nov. 2—Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) says that he has absolutely no intention of trying for the Democratic nomination for President; he will not enter any primary and will disavow any committee set up in his name.

Nov. 7—Speaking at the Boston Museum of Science at a fund-raising reception, President Gerald Ford announces plans to run in the first 3 primaries, in New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Florida.

Nov. 12—Alabama Governor George C. Wallace announces in Montgomery that he will be a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976.

Nov. 18—Voting 4 to 2, the Federal Election Commission rules that the operating expenses of company political action programs can be financed from corporation treasuries; companies may collect voluntary contributions from employees and shareholders and distribute the money among the political candidates of their choice.

Nov. 20—Former California Governor Ronald Reagan announces his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976.

The Federal Election Commission rules that the expenses of President Ford's political trips as an announced

candidate in 1975 will not be charged against his 1976 campaign spending ceiling, except in special cases.

Supreme Court

Nov. 3—The Supreme Court agrees to decide whether President Ford had the authority to impose the \$2-a-barrel tax on imported oil that he levied earlier this year. The United States court of appeals in Washington, D.C., ruled last summer that President Ford lacked the authority but it stayed the effect of its ruling to allow an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Nov. 12—Because of ill health, William O. Douglas retires from the Supreme Court after serving 36½ years.

Nov. 17—The Court rules that Utah may not refuse unemployment benefits to women during the last 3 months of their pregnancy and for 6 weeks after childbirth on the assumption that women are unable to work during that period. The ruling comes in the form of a 3-page unsigned opinion.

Nov. 28—President Ford names a Chicago federal appeals court judge, John Paul Stevens, to take the Supreme Court seat vacated by William O. Douglas last week.

VIETNAM

Nov. 9—Radio Hanoi and Radio Saigon announce the formation of two 25-member delegations to "negotiate to implement a proposal for a national election and a joint governmental body of the unified Vietnam."

Nov. 15—In Saigon, reunification talks begin.

Nov. 18—The reunification conference agrees to base the electoral system for a constituent assembly on North Vietnam's system. The minimum voting age will be 18 and the minimum age for candidates will be 21.

YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 22—The government arrests 9 people on charges of being pro-Soviet Communists.

Nov. 24—The government officially asks the Soviet Union to refrain from interfering in Yugoslav politics.

ISRAELI STATEMENT


(Continued from page 35)

Zionism is to the Jewish people what the liberation movements of Africa and Asia have been to their own people.

You dare talk of racism when I can point with pride to the Arab ministers who have served in my Government, to the Arab deputy speaker of my Parliament, to Arab officers and men serving of their own volition in our defense border and police forces, frequently commanding Jewish troops, to the hundreds of thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East crowding the cities of Israel every year, to the thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East coming for medical treatment to Israel. To the peaceful co-existence which has developed. To the fact that Arabic is an official language in Israel on a par with Hebrew. To the fact that it is as natural for an Arab to serve in public office in Israel as it is incongruous to think of a Jew serving in any public office in an Arab country, indeed being admitted to many of them.

Is that racism? It is not! That, Mr. President, is Zionism.

The issue before this Assembly is not Israel and not Zionism. The issue is the fate of this organization. ■



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